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The primary aim of a dissertation is to try to discover information that could 
assist in solving a particular problem at hand. The object of this dissertation is 
to determine the approach by our courts to apportionment of expenditure in 
terms of section 11(a) read with section 23(g) of the Income Tax Act No 58 of 
1962. A single expenditure incurred for more than one purpose poses a 
problem when deduction of such an expenditure, is sought by a taxpayer. 
The problem that ttie courts have always encountered when dealing with the 
deductibility of expenditure incurred for a dual purpose, is that there is no 
provision in the Income Tax Act that directs what to do when faced with such a 
problem. The courts have always chosen apportionment of expenditure as a 
solution to the deductibility of expenditure incurred for more than one purpose, 
one such purpose being for tax purposes and the other being for non tax 
purposes. 
Apportionment of expenditure is used as a device to allocate part of the 
expenditure, which was incurred to produce income, as taxable expenditure, and 
another part of that expenditure which was incurred to produce non-taxable 
income, as non-deductible expenditure. 
This dissertation seeks to find out whether courts do take into consideration the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act applicable to the deduction of expenditure 
when called upon to make a decision on a particular case. The South African 
Revenue Services use apportionment of expenditure where it deems appropriate 
and the courts have never opposed it. 
v 
The Legislature, which is responsible for the enactment of the act, seems to be 
happy to lie low, and allow the courts to dominate in handling the disputes that 
arise as a result of expenditure incurred with a dual purpose. It has been 
suggested that whilst the Income Tax Act does not provide any direction in 
situations where the deductibility of dual purposes expenditure is in dispute, 
apportionment is implied in the terms of section 11(a) read with section 23(g) of 
the Income Tax Act no 58 of 1962. 
The main aim of this research is to establish whether the path taken by the 
courts is the correct one in terms of section 11(a) and section 23(g) of the 
Income Tax Act no 58 of 1962. It is hoped that this work will be of assistance to 
both The South African Revenue Services and the taxpayers at large in terms of 
understanding that the courts are within the bounds of the Act. 
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THE APPROACH BY OUR COURTS TO THE APPORTIONMENT OF EXPENDITURE 
IN TERMS OF SECTION 11(a) READ WITH SECTION 23 (g) OF THE INCOME TAX 
ACT NO 58 OF 1962 
1.1 Executive Summary 
In the determination of the taxable income, a taxpayer is allowed to deduct from 
his income, expenditure, incurred from carrying on his business or trade, which is 
not of a capital nature, in terms of section 11(a) read with section 23(g) of the 
Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962. The so-called 'General deduction formula' 
comprise section 11(a), which sets out what may be deducted, (the positive test) 
and section 23(g) which stipulates what may not be deducted, (the negative 
test)(De Koker:1995). In order to establish whether the expenditure is 
deductible, the court has to look at the purpose of the act entailing the 
expenditure. If it is performed for the purpose of earning income, then the 
expenditure attendant upon it is deductible. 
A single globular amount, which is laid out for more than one purpose, usually 
poses a problem to the courts, as to how such an amount should be regarded/ 
Where the taxpayer incurs expenditure partly for revenue purposes and partly for 
capital purposes but wholly for trading purposes, then there can be 
apportionment under section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act so that, that part of 
expenditure that produced revenue can be allowed a deduction and the other 
part that was expended for capital purpose is not allowed a deduction (Guardian 
Assurance Holdings). 
The Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962, contains no provisions for apportionment but 
the courts have held that apportionment of expenditure is implied from the terms 
of section 11(a), which permits only the deduction of such expenditure as is 
actually incurred in the production of income. Apportionment of expenditure is 
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also implied from the terms of section 23(g) of the Act, which permits deduction 
of expenditure to the extent to which it is expended for the purposes of trade. 
The courts regard apportionment of expenditure as a solution to a problem 
created, when a taxpayer has incurs a single expenditure for more than one 
purpose, one of which qualifies for deduction and the other of which does not. 
The courts apply apportionment of expenditure in a fair and reasonable manner, 
but take into account the provisions of the Income Tax Act, that relate to the 
deductibility of expenditure. 
1.2 The problem statement 
This study seeks to determine the approach by our courts to the deductibility of 
expenditure incurred with mixed motives. The deductibility of expenditure from 
income of a taxpayer is determined by the so-called 'The general deduction 
formula' which comprise section 11(a) read with section 23. Section 11(a) 
requires that for income to qualify for deduction, it must have been incurred in 
the production of income in the course of trade and is not of a capital nature. 
This means that any expenditure incurred for a profit producing asset is an 
expenditure of a capital nature and therefore not allowable as a deduction in 
terms of section 11(a). 
Section 23 stipulates that the deduction of expenditure will only be allowed to 
the extent to which it was incurred for the purposes of trade. According to this 
section of the Act, any monies not expended for the purposes of trade, e.g., 
spending on private things, cannot qualify for deduction as was the case in L v 
Commissioner of Taxes (1992) 54 SATC 91 (ZHC). 
In this case the taxpayer was a partner in a firm of legal practitioners in 
Zimbambwe. Her work involved a lot of reading and as a result her vision slowly 
deteriorated such that she ended up being almost blind. She decided to undergo 
surgery in South Africa. In connection with the operation she incurred 
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expenditure of R4200 on air tickets, medical treatment and hospital and drugs 
charges. She claimed these expenses as a deduction from her income, in terms 
of section 11(a) of the Act. 
The court held, as was the case in CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 1955 (3) SA 293 
(A); 20 SATC 113,that the expenditure could not be regarded as so closely 
connected with the performance of the taxpayer's legal practice as to be part of 
the cost of performing it. The expenditure was domestic or private expenditure 
and as such was prohibited as a deduction in terms of the Act. 
The Old version of section 23 was very restrictive in that it prohibited any 
deduction of expenditure that was not expended 'wholly and exclusively' for the 
purpose of trade. The new version is somewhat accommodative in that it 
recognizes the extent to which the expenditure was incurred for the purposes of 
trade. 
Sometimes expenditure is incurred with mixed motives. A company might pay 
remuneration to its directors and only a portion of it might be considered by the 
Commissioner to have been laid out for the purposes of earning income. 
Expenditure may be laid out partly for the purposes of earning income in terms 
of the definition of the term 'income' in section 1 of the Income Tax Act and 
partly for the purposes of earning income exempt from tax in terms of section 10 
of the Income Tax Act. A single expenditure may be incurred partly for the 
purposes of producing income and partly for the purposes of acquiring a fixed 
asset for the business. 
The court in ITC No 832, 1956, held that the Income Tax Act does not provide 
any guidance with regards to the treatment of single indivisible amounts that are 
incurred for more than one purpose. In the absence of the statutory directive, 
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the courts have had to play their role of finding solutions to disputes regarding 
the deductibility of expenditure, incurred with mixed motives. 
In Bowden v Russel and Russel (1965) 42 TC 301,as reported in Pick 'n Pay 
Wholesaler case, (Ch) Pennycuick L, held that it might often be difficult to 
determine whether the person incurring the expense has in mind two distinct 
purposes, or a single purpose which will or may not produce some secondary 
consequences. But once it is found that the person has a distinct purpose other 
than that of enabling him to carry on and earn profits in his trade or profession 
section 137(a) prohibits deduction of the expenses. 
In CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 935 (A), 45 SATC 241, Corbett JA as he 
then was, suggested that apportionment is a practical solution to what otherwise 
could be an intractable problem and in a situation where the only other answer, 
namely disallowance of the whole amount of expenditure or allowance of the 
whole thereof, would produce inequality or anomaly one way or the other. It is 
said that in making such an apportionment, the courts normally consider what 
would be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. 
In rrc No 699 the court held that where an amount of money is expended for a 
dual purpose and one of those purposes would not qualify for expenditure for 
deduction from income for tax purposes, it would seem that no portion of the 
amount expended might be so deducted. The reason for this provision, it was 
suggested, was because it would open up very difficult inquiries if the amounts 
expended in this way had to be dissected, and would throw up the Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue and the Court, which has to deal with income tax matters, an 
almost impossible burden. 
It would seem therefore that there is no single test that can be regarded as a 
touchstone for the deductibility of expenditure with mixed motives. The Income 
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Tax Act does not provide any solution to the same problem. However the court 
in TTC No 607,1945, concluded that the Income Tax Act itself contains no 
provision for such apportionment, but according to Income Tax Case No 832 
1956, that may be regarded as implied from the terms of section ll(2)(a), which 
permit only the deduction of such expenditure as is actually incurred in the 
production of income and not of a capital nature. 
The court in Income Tax Case No 800,1954, supra, suggested that a taxpayer 
was entitled to make apportionment if it is possible for him to do so and if 
neither the taxpayer nor the Commissioner can make any allocation, it is still 
open to the Court to make such allocation. 
It is necessary, therefore, to investigate the approach by our courts to 
apportionment of expenditure, laid out for more than one purpose. The 
investigation will cover the extent to which the courts take the relevant sections 
of the Act into account, when deciding on these cases. The so-called 'General 
deduction formula' also be covered in the investigation to determine the extent 
the courts take it into account when deciding ion these issues. 
1.3 Relevance of the study 
In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Rand Selections Ltd 1956, the 
representative of the taxpayer company contended that the Act does not direct 
how apportionment of expenditure should be approached or tell us how to 
ascertain what portion of the expenditure may be deducted from 'income', or the 
whole of the expenditure is deductible from the 'income'. The absence of the Act 
that guides the contesting parties burdens the court with the job of finding 
solutions to all the disputes that concern the deductibility of expenditure, which 
is incurred for more than one purpose. 
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The study of the approach by our courts to apportionment of expenditure is long 
overdue. Not many people will agree that they know the criteria the court use 
when making decisions regarding the deductibility of a single expenditure 
incurred with more than one purpose. 
The previous version of section 23(g) of the Act disallowed any claim for 
expenditure where the expenditure was not wholly or exclusively laid out for the 
purposes of trade. This is illustrated in the case, ITC No 1385, 1984, where the 
court disallowed the deduction on the grounds that the expenditure in question 
was at least part paid out to protect appellant's future home and that there could 
be no apportionment. 
The court felt that it could not be said that the expenditure had been laid out 
wholly or exclusively for the purposes of trade because part of the expenditure 
was directed at the protection of the taxpayer's home. The new version of 
section 23(g) takes into account the extent to which the expenditure is incurred 
for the purposes of the taxpayer's trade. 
This study will help taxpayers to understand how the courts approach 
apportionment of expenditure, and how these courts identify expenditure 
incurred with more than one purpose. The study will also help the taxpayers to 
understand that the applicable Act is important in deciding on the apportionment 
of expenditure case. The manner of handling these cases will highlight especially 
the applicability and the importance of case law as guide in making decisions on 
these cases. This study may serve as a catalyst in encouraging the legislature 
to take an active role, to provide guidelines to the courts, so that the approach 
by the courts in solving the problems of apportionment of expenditure, is 
uniform. 
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1.4 Research objectives 
The objectives and the scope of this study are as follows: 
To identify the reasons why courts opt for apportionment of expenditure 
To determine whether the Income Tax Act does envisage apportionment of 
expenditure. 
To identify methods of apportionment of expenditure. 






2.1 Types of research 
Research can be classified into exploratory research, conclusive research and 
performance monitoring research. Conclusive research is designed to provide 
information for the evaluation of alternative course of action. Conclusive 
research can also be sub classified into descriptive research and causal research. 
Descriptive research is appropriate when the researcher wants to portray the 
characteristics of the marketing phenomena and determining the frequency of 
occurrence. Exploratory research is appropriate when the research objectives 
include; 
• identifying problems and opportunities, 
• Gaining perspective regarding the breadth of variables operating in the 
situation. 
This research study will use the case study method, which is an analysis of 
events or conditions and their inter-relationship, with the aim of finding answers 
to the research problem. Five cases will be selected for thorough analysis. 
These cases will, according to the researcher, represent the majority of cases 
where 'apportionment of expenditure' is used as a solution to the problem of the 
deductibility of expenditure from income. 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Cooper and Emory: 1995, suggest that secondary data are already published 
data collected for the purposes other than the specific research needs at hand. 
Such data can be classified as internal or external. Internal data is available 
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within the organization, whereas external secondary data are provided by 
sources outside the organization. Secondary data rarely fulfill the requirements 
of a research project. 
The central advantage of secondary data is the saving in cost and time in 
comparison with primary data sources. While secondary data may not 
completely satisfy all the requirements of a study, they may aid in the 
formulation of the decision problem, suggest methods and types of data for 
meeting the information needs, and serve as a source of comparative data by 
which data can be interpreted and evaluated. The advantages of secondary data 
relate to the extent that the data fit the information needs of the project and the 
accuracy of the data. 
One of Adam Smith's basic maxims from his book (The Wealth of Nations; 1779) 
is that, "The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of 
the Government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; 
that is, in proportion to the revenues which they respectively enjoy under the 
protection of the state. 
The expense of the Government to the individuals of a great nation is like an 
expense of management to the joint tenant of a great state, who are all obliged 
to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the state". It may be 
correct to accept the relevance of the maxim to our tax system in that our tax 
system is based on the premise that those who are well to do carry a greater 
proportion of the burden of funding the state than the poor. 
2.2.2 The Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962 
South Africa has recently moved away from sourced based system of taxation to 
residence bases system of taxation. Our system of taxation is based on a 
9 
mixture of direct and indirect taxation. Income tax, in South Africa is levied in 
terms of a statute, which is called as the Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962, 
hereafter to be referred to as "The Act". Tax is levied on all persons who have 
taxable income. 
Tax is an annual tax calculated by applying predetermined rates to the taxable 
income of a person. This was confirmed by Botha J.A. in Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v 
Secretary for Inland Revenue (SIR) where he said that 'tax' is an annual event. 
The manner for determining taxable income in terms of The Act can be 
summarized as follows: 
Gross income (sectionl) 
Less Exempt Income (section 10) 
Income 
Less Deductions (Section 11-19 and 23) 
Add Taxable capital gains (section 26A) 
TAXABLE INCOME 
Income is defined as follows: 
"means that amount remaining of the gross income of any person for any 
year or period of assessment after deducting there from any amounts exempt 
from normal tax under Part 1 of chapter 22 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962" 
Keith Huxham and Phillip Haupt, (2004) define taxable income as follows: 
"..means the aggregate of -
• The amount remaining after deducting from the income of any person all 
amounts allowed under Part 1 of Chapter 11 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962 to be deducted from or set off against such income; and all income 
to be included or deemed to be included in the taxable income of any 







2.2.3 Gross Income 
Silke (2001) regards the definition of 'gross income' in section 1 of the Income 
Tax Act as central to the whole of the Income Tax Act. Gross income is defined 
in section 1 of The Act as; 
"In the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by 
or accrued to or in farvour of such resident; or 
In the case of any person other than a resident, the total amount, in cash or 
otherwise, received by or accrued to or in farvour of such a person from source 
worldwide, during such year or period of assessment, excluding receipts and 
accruals of a capital nature...." 
Beardle, J in Local Investment Co v Commissioner of Taxes (SR) 1958 (3) SA 34, 
defined 'gross income' as "all income receipts of the taxpayer". According to 
him 'Income' is defined as 'gross income less such amounts, which are exempt 
from income tax in terms of the Act.' It is on the 'taxable income' that tax is 
assessed. 
2.2.4 Residence and source 
South Africa has moved away from a source basis of taxation to residence basis 
of taxation since January 2001. The source basis of taxation subjects income of 
a taxpayer that is from a South African source whereas the residence basis of 
taxation subjects a taxpayer's income from any where in the world. However, 
source continues to be important for two reasons, namely; 
• Persons who are not resident in South Africa are subject to tax on all 
income which are from a South African source, and; for a variety of 
reasons Double Tax treaties often use source of income as a basis for the 
provisions contained in the treaty. This means that the application of the 
provisions of a double tax treaty often requires the identification of the 
source of income. 
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2.2.5 Definition of 'Resident* 
Resident is defined in the Income Tax Act as follows: 
'resident' means any-
natural person who is ordinarily resident in the Republic; or 
not at any time during the year of assessment ordinarily resident in the 
Republic, if such person was physically present in the Republic-
for a period or periods exceeding 91 days in aggregate during the relevant year 
of assessment, as well as for a period or periods exceeding 91 days in 
aggregate during each of the three years of assessment preceding such year of 
assessment; and for a period or periods exceeding 549 days in aggregate during 
such three preceding years of assessment: 
Provided that, where a person who is resident in terms of this paragraph is 
physically outside the Republic for a continuous period of at least 330 full days 
immediately after the day on which such person ceases to be physically present 
in the Republic, such person shall be deemed not to have been resident from the 
day on which such person so ceased to be physically present in the Republic; or 
Person (other than a natural) which is incorporated, established or formed in the 
Republic or which has its place of effective management in the Republic (but 
excluding any international headquarter company) 
2.2.6 Courts decisions 
Where the sections of the Income Tax Act are not clear, it becomes necessary 
for the taxpayer and also The Receiver of Revenue Commissioner to approach 
the court to settle disputes. If a taxpayer is not satisfied with the assessment he 
can objects to the assessment. If his objection is rejected by the Commissioner, 
he can appeal to an Appeal Board, then to the Income Tax Special Court, and 
thereafter to the Supreme Court. The judgements of our courts are important in 
that they interpret and clarify sections of the Act where there is uncertainty and 
as such they form part of out tax law. 
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2.2.7 Allowable deductions 
In the process of determining the taxable income of a taxpayer, 
Practice Note No 31 Of 3rd October, 1994, suggests that to qualify as a deduction 
in terms of section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act no 58 of 1962, expenditure must 
be incurred in the carrying on of a 'trade' as defined in section 1 of The Act. The 
provisions of The Act no 58 of 1962 relating to deductions fall into two 
categories. 
The first one is 'The general deduction formula' consisting of section 11(a) read 
with section 23(g), which lay down the general principles of deductibility. The 
second category consists of the various deductions, which are specifically 
authorized by the Act. According to Judge Corbett JA as he then was, in CIR v 
Pick xn Pay Wholesalers 49 SATC 132 1987 (3) SA 453 (A), section 11(a) provides 
for the deduction of; 
"Expenditure and losses actually incurred in the production of income, provided 
such expenditure and losses are not of a capital nature". 
The current version of section 23(g) provides that 
"No deductions shall in any case be made in respect of the following matters, 
namely: 
Any moneys, claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the 
extent to which such moneys were not laid out or expended wholly and 
exclusively for the purposes of trade." 
The earlier version of section 23(g) provides: 
"no deduction shall in any case be made in respect of the following matters, 
namely; 
(g) Any moneys, claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, which 
are not wholly or exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of trade" 
(Silke:2001) 
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Silke: (2001) breaks down the general deduction formula into the following 
elements, namely; 
The expenditure and losses 
Must be actually incurred 
During the year of assessment 
In the production of income 
They must not constitute expenditure and losses of a capital nature, and 
If they are claimed, as a deduction against income derived from trade, they 
must, either in part or in full constitute moneys that are laid out or expended for 
the purposes of trade. 
The court in KBI v Van Der Walt 1986 (4) SA 303 (T) laid down that section 
11(a) and section 23(g) must be read together when one considers whether an 
amount is capable of deduction. 
Expenditure under section 11 is deductible only if trade carried on. It is a 
precondition of the deductibility of all items in sub-paragraph (a) to (n) of section 
11 that the taxpayer be carrying on trade. The term 'trade' is defined in section 
1 and according to Notes on South African Income Tax 2003, Trade' includes 
every profession, trade, business, employment, calling, occupation or venture, 
including the letting of any property and the use of, or the grant of permission to 
use any patent, or trade mark, or any copyright, or any other property which is 
of a similar nature. 
In ITC 770 (1953 AD) 19 SATC 216 as reported in the Burgess v CIR case, 
Dowling J said, dealing with the definition of 'trade' in Act 31 of 1941, that it was 
obviously intended to embrace every profitable activity and it should be given the 
widest possible interpretation. In CIR v Scott 1928 AD 252, 3 SATC 253, Wessel 
JA who delivered the judgement of the appellate division of the Supreme Court 
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said that "it was necessary to know whether the acts of the taxpayer in buying 
and selling those properties showed that he was carrying on the trade or 
business of a land jobber. Whether he was or was not carrying on such a 
business was an inference from facts. 
The expenditure incurred that is referred to in section 11 of the Act may be 
claimed as a deduction only against income, as defined, derived from the 
carrying on of any trade. To establish whether a taxpayer is carrying on a trade 
is a question of law to be decided on the facts of each case. It would appear 
from the terms of section 11 that the Act contemplates the carrying on of more 
than one trade, and that deductions should be allowed from each trade as a unit 
by it self. 
Where the allowable deductions in any particular trade exceed income, then, as 
regards to that particular trade, there is an assessed loss which, in terms of 
section 20(l)(b), may be set off against other income derived by the taxpayer. 
Whilst the Act contemplates the separate determination of a taxable income or 
assessed loss in respect of each trade carried on, these income or losses must be 
aggregated for the purposes of the determination of the taxable income as a 
single amount in the end. 
Sometimes a taxpayer undertakes to carry on a business with no objective of 
making a profit, the court in ITC 615 (1946) 14 SATC 399, held that in 
appropriate circumstances the taxpayer would be regarded as carrying on a 
trade. The term 'trade', in spite of its wide meaning, does not embrace all 
activities that might produce income. In ITC 512 (1941) 12 SATC 246, the court 
held that a person who accumulated his savings and invest them in interest 
bearing securities or shares, held as assets of a capital nature does not derive 
the income from carrying on a trade. 
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However in ITC 770 (1953) 19 SATC 216, the court was of the opinion that the 
scale and the nature of the investment in securities or shares held as assets of a 
capital nature may be such as to amount to the carrying on of trade. 
Trade implies an active occupation, something more than watching over existing 
investments that are not income producing and are not intended or expected to 
be so. The holding of investment does not imply a continuance of trade, even if 
it was acquired when trade was carried on. 
Where a company makes loans to its shareholders or relatives of the 
shareholders and charge interest, the court in ITC 957(1960) 24 SATC 637, held 
that the interest received was not derived from the carrying on of trade. 
In ITC 368 (1936) the word Venture" was defined as " a transaction in which a 
person risks something with the object of making a profit. 
In Burgers v CIR (1993 AD) the court was of the opinion that an investment, in 
the nature of a speculation, with the hope of a future profit, would not always 
have to be risky to constitute trade. It is obvious that trade, covers a wide 
spectrum of activities, but that there are certain activities which fall outside the 
scope of its definition. Of these the most common are investments made in 
dividend and interest bearing stock. 
2.2.8 Expenditure and 'losses' 
The word Moss' has been defined by courts and Keith Huxham et al (2003) 
regards expenditure and losses as cash outflows, to liabilities which may be 
settled in cash or otherwise. In Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1946 AD 157, 13 
SATC 354, the court considered that the word had several meanings and that it 
was not clear that they meant anything other than expenditure, but that possibly 
losses were expenditure of an involuntary nature. In SATC 360 case the court 
described the word 'loss' in relation to trading operations as sometimes used to 
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signify a deprivation suffered by the loser, usually an involuntary deprivation, 
whereas expenditure usually means a voluntary payment of money. 
In Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways Co Ltd v CIR (1936 CPD) the court 
considered that the term Mosses' may refer to losses of floating capital employed 
in the trade which produces income. According to COT v BSA Co Investment Ltd 
1966 (!) SA 530 (SRAD) case, the word 'loss' is confined to the actual 
expenditure or outgoing which the taxpayer seeks to deduct from his gross 
income. The Rhodesian Income Tax Appeals Special Court after review of a 
number of these cases, concluded that the word Moss' meant an outgoing of 
some kind and not simply a diminution in the value of an asset (ITC 1218(1974) 
36 SATC 212). 
Sometimes it happens that a loss is sustained that does not involve any 
expenditure, for example, a bad debt. A bad debt may not be deducted under 
section l l ( i ) if its amount has not been included in income, as would be the 
position with a debt due to a money-lender. In Plate Glass and Shutterprofe 
Industries Finance Co (Pty) Ltd v SIR 1979 (3) SA 1124 (T) 41 SATC 103, a loss 
computed for accounting for accounting purposes by reference to the difference 
between the amount of a foreign obligation converted to rands at a rate of 
exchange prevailing at the year end and the amount of the obligation converted 
to the rands at the rate of exchange prevailing on some earlier date was 
accepted as being a Moss' for the purposes of section 11(a). 
It was suggested in Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR 1975 (!) SA 665 (A), 37 SATC 1 
that the word 'expenditure' is not restricted to an outlay of cash but includes 
outlays of amounts in a form other than cash. If, for example, a merchant was 
required to pay for his goods by tendering land or shares in a company, the 
value of the land or shares would constitute expenditure in terms of section 
11(a) and would be deductible. Where a merchant buys his goods from the 
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United States at a price fixed in dollars, the liability so contracted would be 
'expenditure' and would have to be brought to account at its equivalent in South 
African currency. 
2.2.9 Actually incurred 
In determining the taxable income of a person carrying on any trade in any year 
of assessment there is, in terms of section 11(a), deductible from such a 
person's income the expenditure actually incurred by him in the production of 
income during that year of assessment (Caltex Oil (SA) Limited v SIR 1975 (1) 
SA 665 (A). In CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242,it was held that it is only at the end of 
that year of assessment that it is possible, and then it is imperative, to determine 
the amounts received or accrued on the one hand and the expenditure actually 
incurred on the other during the year of assessment. 
According to ITC 542, 13 SATC 116, it was suggested that the expression 
'expenditure actually incurred' in section 11(a) does not mean expenditure 
actually paid during the year of assessment, but means all expenditure for which 
a liability has been incurred during that year, whether the liability has been 
discharged during that year or not. This thus suggest that it is the tax year in 
which the liability for the expenditure is incurred, and not in the tax year in 
which it is actually paid, that the expenditure is actually incurred for the 
purposes of section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
Watermeyer AJP, in Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways Company Ltd v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue, supra, said the words of the statute are 
'actually incurred' and not 'necessarily incurred' The use of word 'actually' as 
contrasted with the word 'necessarily, according to him, may widen the field of 
deductible expenditure. An example would that of a man who conducts his 
business inefficiently or extravagantly, actually incurring expenses which another 
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man does not incur; such expenses therefore are not 'necessary' but they are 
actually incurred and therefore deductible. 
Expenses actually incurred, does not mean they are actually paid. So long as the 
liability to pay them actually has been incurred they may be deductible. The 
court in the same case gave an example of a trader who may at the end of the 
income tax year owe money for stocks purchased in the course of the year or for 
services rendered to him. He has not paid such liability but they are deductible. 
The actual payment is therefore not essential for the deduction of expenditure: 
the Act merely requires that it must have been 'incurred'. In ITC 542 (1942) 13 
SATC 116, the court gave the definition of the word 'incurred' as meaning either 
'paid' or 'becoming liable for7. 
In ITC 1117 1968 30 SATC 130,the court said it did not regard the presence of 
the qualifying word 'actually' in section 11(a) as adding anything to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of 'incurred', observing that 'expenditure is either incurred or is 
not incurred and if no legal liability for it arises it is not 'incurred'. This approach 
was, however criticized in the CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd case supra, where 
the Judge said that this was contrary to the firmly established rule of statutory 
construction that a meaning must be given to every word. 
According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the adverb actually means 'in act 
or fact; really'. In an unreported decision an Australian decision suggest that it 
means 'ascertained', 'encountered' 'run into', fallen upon' and not merely, 
'impending, threatened, or expected'. In other words, or so it would appear 
from the line of the court's reasoning, the liability under consideration must not 
be contingent. 
The words 'actually incurred' rule out the deduction of provisions for expenditure 
or losses that are uncertain or may arise in the future or that are no more than 
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impending or expected. In ITC 169 (1930) 5 SATC 162, it was said that if there 
is no definite and absolute liability during the year of assessment to pay an 
amount, expenditure has not been 'actually incurred' 
In Nasionale Pers v KBI 1986 (3) SA 549 (A), 48 SATC 55, the court said in 
relation to the words 'actually incurred "Die vereiste dat die onkoste 'werklik 
angegaan' moet wees, het egter tot gevolge dat moontlike toekomstige uitgawes 
wat bloot as waarskynlik geag word nie ingevolge art 11 (a) aftrekbaar is nie. 
Alleen onkoste ten opsigte waarvan die belastingbetaler 'n volstreke en 
onvoorwaardelike aanspreekheid op die hals gehaal het, mag in die betroke 
belastingjaar afgetrek word". 
In Edgars Stores Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 50 SATC 81, 1988 (3) 
SA 876 (A), it was said that our courts distinguish between; 
Cases where the existence of the liability itself is conditional or subject to 
some contingency, and; 
Cases where the existence of the liability itself is certain, but its amount is 
uncertain and cannot be accurately determined at the tax year-end. 
Where the existence of the liability itself is dependent upon a future event, then 
the liability cannot be said to have been incurred. The fact of the liability must 
be absolute. It must not be conditional or subject to contingency. All the events 
giving rise to the liability must have occurred. 
It is clear that only the expenditure in respect of which the taxpayer has incurred 
an unconditional legal obligation during the year of assessment in question may 
be deducted in terms of section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 from 
income returned for that year. The obligation may be unconditional ab initio or, 
though initially conditional, may become unconditional by fulfillment of the 
condition during the year of assessment; in either case the relative expenditure 
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is deductible in that year. But if the obligation is initially incurred as a conditional 
one during a particular year of assessment and the condition is fulfilled only in 
the following year of assessment, it is deductible only in the latter year of 
assessment. This means that estimates of contingent liabilities are not 
expenditure 'actually incurred' as was said in Pyott Ltd v CIR 1945 AD 128, 13 
SATC 121. 
Silke: (1995) is of the opinion that the words 'actually incurred' do not mean that 
the expenditure must be due and payable at the end of the year of assessment. 
As long as there is a clear legal liability to pay at the end of the year, the 
expenditure is deductible even though actual payments may fall due only in a 
later year. This was the case in ITC 674 (1949) 16 SATC 235, where the 
taxpayer, in his financial statements for that particular tax year end, made 
provision for holiday pay due to his employees that was payable only in the 
month of December that followed the year of assessment. 
It was found that in terms of the industrial agreement applying to the industry in 
which the taxpayer operated, there was an absolute liability to pay the holiday 
pay, for which a deduction was allowable even though payment was postponed. 
Where there is no absolute liability to pay, the courts have in the past disallowed 
deduction. This was the case in KBI v Nasionale Pers Bpk 1984 ($) SA 551 ©, 
46 SATC 83, where a company claimed deduction for the portion of annual 
bonuses it considered to be appropriate to the period ending on the last day of 
each year of assessment. Its employees could, however, at those dates make no 
claim for bonuses, becoming eligible for them some months later. The court 
disallowed the deduction on the grounds no liability existed at the relevant dates 
and that there was no expenditure actually incurred. 
Where a taxpayer carries on a business, which has a number of branches, which 
together make up a single business, these branches are not different entities in 
21 
law. This means that any payment representing expenditure that one side of the 
business is supposed to have paid to the other cannot rank as allowable 
deduction from income since no expenditure will have been incurred as required 
by section 11(a) of the Act (1TC 103 (1927) 3 SATC 328). It is an established 
principle of income tax law that a man cannot lend to himself, trade with himself 
or make a profit out of himself. 
2.2.1 Incurred during the year of assessment 
The courts have held that the claim, in terms of section 11(a), for the deduction 
of expenditure or loss must be made in the year of assessment when the 
expenditure or loss was 'actually incurred'. This means that the accounting 
principle of matching does not apply in the case of tax and that the expenditure 
must be claimed in the year in which it is incurred. 
Deductible expenditure cannot be carried forward to a subsequent year or 
carried back to a previous year even though it may properly relate to the income 
of those particular years. The court In Concentra (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1942) CPD, 
refused a claim for deduction of expenditure on the grounds that the expenditure 
should have been claimed in the years in which it arose, and that, by failing to 
claim at the right time, the company had forfeited its right to claim a deduction 
in terms of section 11(a) 
In this case the company had claimed as a deduction certain expenditure relating 
to the directors' expenses, which had arisen in earlier years. In Caltex Oil (SA) 
Limited v SIR 37 SATC 1975 (!) SA 665 (A), the court reaffirmed the earlier 
courts' decisions that it is only at the end of the year of assessment that it is 
possible. And then it is imperative, to determine the amounts received or 
accrued on the one hand and the expenditure actually incurred on the other 
during the year of assessment. 
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The principle of the decision in this case is that the expenditure incurred during 
the year of assessment must be calculated and brought into account for the 
purposes of section 11(a) at the end of that year or at the date of the discharge 
of that liability within that year. In Sub Nigel Ltd v CIR (1948) AD the court ruled 
that the scheme of the Act shows that, as the taxpayer is assessed for income 
tax for a period of one year, no expenditure incurred in the year previous to the 
particular tax year can be deducted. 
There are certain exceptions to this rule. Section 23H Of the Act, limits the 
deduction available for expenditure in certain circumstances and among the so-
called special deductions described in chapter 8. If the expenditure is incurred in 
respect of services to be rendered, the deduction in a particular year of 
assessment is limited to the amount which bears to the total amount of the 
expenditure the same ratio as the number of months during which the services 
are rendered in that year bears to the total number of months during which the 
service will be rendered. The effect of section 22 of the Act is that the cost of 
goods or other assets bought for resale is deductible in the year of assessment in 
which the goods or assets are eventually sold. 
2.2.11 In the production of income 
Definition of "in production of income" 
In Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways Company Ltd v CIR (1936 CPD), I" in 
production of income" it was contended that any expenditure or losses, sought 
to be deducted from income, must have been incurred in the production of 
income. The income referred to is that as defined in section 1 of the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962, that is, the gross income less the exempt income. It follows that 
if the expenditure is incurred to produce income that fall outside 'gross income' 
as defined in section 1 of the same Act or produce income that is exempt from 
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tax in terms of section 10 of the Income Tax Act no 58 of 1962, all such amounts 
not being included in 'income' as defined, the expenditure is not deductible. 
The element 'in production of income' requires a link between the act, giving 
rise to the expenditure and the earning of income. 
The term 'in production of income' has been the subject of a number of court 
cases which have attempted to define its meaning. In Port Elizabeth Electric 
Tramway Co Ltd v CIR (1936 CPD), the court was called upon to decide whether 
certain expenditure incurred by the company, as a result of an accident, was 
properly deductible, being 'expenditure in the production of income'. A vehicle 
belonging to the company had been involved in an accident, as a result of which 
the driver had been fatally injured. 
The company was compelled to pay compensation and legal costs that was 
incurred when it contested the claim of the deceased representatives. The court 
held that whilst compensation paid, was incurred in the production of income, 
the legal costs incurred in resisting the claim were not. The court in the same 
case explained that gross income is not produced directly by either expenditure 
or losses. It is the results from work and labour or the use of capital in 
productive enterprise or loan of capital and it is produced in diverse ways. 
Income is produced by a series of operations and transactions entered into for 
the purpose of manufacturing or acquiring products to be sold and thereafter 
selling it or by rendering services for which a payment is received. In the course 
of such operations and transactions, expenditure and losses may be incurred and 
these are the expenditure and losses referred to in the Act. 
The court further pointed out that..." In order to determine whether expenditure 
and losses have been incurred in the production of income, one needs to 
enquire: 
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Whether the act, to which expenditure is attached, is performed in the 
production of income, and 
Whether the expenditure is linked to it closely enough." 
This means that, therefore, the act must be identified first and a decision made 
as to whether or not it was performed for the purpose of producing income, 
And, secondly, the expenditure sought to be deducted must be closely linked to 
the performance of the act identified. 
Since the employment of the driver was necessary for carrying on the business 
of the company, and since the employment of the driver carried with it, as a 
necessary consequence, a potential liability to pay compensation if those drivers 
were injured in the course of their employment, the court considered that the 
compensation paid by the company had to be regarded as being so closely 
connected with the income-earning act from which the expenditure arose as to 
form part of the cost of performing it. The compensation was therefore allowed 
as a deduction. 
All that had to be decided was whether the damages paid was closely linked to 
the employment of the driver as to as to be regarded as part of the cost of 
performing the income earning operation. The court held that the legal costs 
were expended in resisting a demand for compensation, and since this was not 
an operation entered into for the purpose of earning income, the legal costs 
were disallowed. 
The court further suggested that where the act done is unlawful or negligent and 
the attendant expenses are caused by unlawfulness or possibly by negligence of 
the act, then it would not be deductible. However in Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR 
1946 AD 157, 13 SATC 354, the court held that damages which were paid out, 
were only deductible if they constitute expenditure not of a capital nature, and 
were incurred in the production of income in respect of which tax was levied. In 
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that case damages paid out did not pass the test of deductibility. The damages 
were paid out to discharge a debt or legal liability to the plumber's dependents, 
arising out of appellant's negligence in performing a trading operation. 
On the question of the deductibility of expenses, the court further held that all 
expenses attached to the performance of a business operation genuinely 
performed for the purpose of earning income are deductible, whether such 
expenses are necessary for its performance or attached to it by chance, or are 
incurred for the more efficient performance of such operation provided there are 
so closely connected with it that they may be regarded as part of the cost of 
performing it. 
It would seem that the above paragraph deals with three types of expenditures, 
namely; 
(i) Expenses which are necessary for the performance of the business 
(ii) Expenses which are attached to the performance of the business 
operations 
(iii)Expenses which are bona fide incurred for the more efficient performance 
of such business operations. 
In CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd, 1955 (3) SA 293 (A), 20 SATC 113, the principle 
laid down in Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co case was cited with approval 
when Schreiner JA, who delivered the judgement of the appellate division, said: 
"If I'm right in understanding the words 'they may be regarded' as connoting 
that it would be proper, natural or reasonable to regard the expenses as part of 
the cost of performing the operation, this passage seems to state the approach 
to such question correctly." 
In Sub-Nigen Ltd v CIR 1948 (4) SA 580 (A), 15 SATC 381, the court 
authoritatively established that the words, 'incurred in the production of income' 
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do not mean that before a particular item of expenditure may be deducted it 
must be shown that it produced any income for the particular year of 
assessment. What was important was to establish whether expenditure had 
been incurred to produce income as defined in section 1 of the Act, in the 
current of future year of assessment. 
In that case it was held that amounts paid by way of premiums on insurance 
policies against loss of profits and loss of standing charges occasioned by fire, 
were incurred in the production of income. The court further ruled that the fact 
that no income had actually been produced, was irrelevant and that the 
expenditure had been incurred for the purpose of producing income and was, 
therefore, deductible. 
In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Allied Building Society 25 SATC 343 1963 
(4) SA 1 (A), the court argued that as the society's business was to borrow 
money it was also obliged to pay interest on those monies in order to continue to 
conduct its business. The payment of interest was thus, literally, necessary in 
order to earn income. 
The court concluded that it was not concerned with whether a particular item of 
income produced any part of income, but with whether that item of expenditure 
was incurred for the purpose of earning income. Thus, according to the Court's 
reasoning the 'purposes' for which the expenditure was incurred is decisive in 
determining the deductibility of expenditure. If the expenditure is incurred for 
the purposes of earning income, then it is deductible. 
In Weinberg v CIR, 14 SATC 210, where the taxpayer was a garage owner who 
undertook let one of his customers park his car in his garage for a monthly fee. 
One day, an employee instead of taking the car to the garage, he drove it to his 
own home, and on his way back ran the car into a building, damaging the car 
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beyond recognition. The taxpayer was obliged to pay for the resultant damages 
and claimed these to be deductible expenditure. However, the court held that, 
when the employee drove the car into the building, he was not engaged in the 
rendering of any service in the normal course of business operations of his 
employ. 
The act of damaging the car was not the inevitable or practically inevitable result 
of the contract, which the appellant had with the owner of the car and the 
expenditure was thus not incurred in the production of income. Therefore for the 
expenditure to qualify for deduction, according to this case decision, the act 
entailing expenditure must be an inevitable or practically inevitable result of the 
operations of the business. 
In ITC 233, the taxpayer carried on a business of a stevedore. A man passing by 
was struck by an object, which fell out of the net whilst the taxpayer was loading 
the vessel, and died. The taxpayer was obliged to pay the dependents of the 
deceased damages. The court held that the payment of damages had to be 
regarded as incidental to the business such as stevedoring and therefore was 
deductible. 
In CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 935 (A), 45 SATC 241, the court clearly 
reiterated the fact that, to rank as a deduction, expenditure must not only have 
been incurred for the purpose of earning 'income' as defined, but there must be 
a sufficiently distinct and direct relationship or link between expenditure incurred 
and the actual earning of the income. 
Corbett JA who delivered the judgement of the appellate Division said "It is 
correct... that in order to determine in a particular case whether moneys outlaid 
by the taxpayer constitute expenditure incurred in the production of income, 
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important, sometimes overriding factors, are the purpose of the expenditure and 
what the expenditure actually effects." 
The requirement that there must be a sufficiently distinct and direct relationship 
or link between the expenditure incurred and the actual earning of income does 
not impose an investigation into the business efficacy of taxpayers. 
In ITC 1600 (1995) 58 SATC 131, the taxpayer hired a computer equipment for 
use in one of his divisions. The fortunes of the business declined and the 
taxpayer had to cancel the lease agreement but had to pay a cancellation fee. 
The court held that if the taxpayer had not disposed of the computer but 
replaced it with a cheaper and more efficient system, he would have been able 
to continue deducting the payments. It was further pointed out that the 
expenditure was made in good faith in the normal course of business and 
accordingly the taxpayer was entitled to the deduction claimed for the lease 
termination payments. 
The expenditure is incurred in the production of income even if the taxpayer is 
not obliged to incur. This will be the case with voluntary expenditure incurred in 
order to induce an employee to enter and remain in the taxpayer's service. In 
Provider v COT 1950 SR 161, 17 SATC 40, the taxpayer had initiated two 
schemes for the benefit of his employees. 
One scheme was a service bonus and the other was a life assurance scheme. 
Under these schemes, which were non contributory, the taxpayer undertook to 
pay, firstly, a bonus on retirement to any employee who had been in the employ 
of the taxpayer for a certain period, and, secondly, a benefit to dependents of 
the employees who died whilst in the taxpayer's service, both the bonus and 
benefit being linked to the length of service. 
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The taxpayer claimed a deduction for the payments, which he had made in terms 
of these schemes, on the grounds that they constituted 'expenditure actually 
incurred in the production of income'. The Commissioner allowed as a deduction 
the bonuses but not the benefits paid to dependents. Tredgold Q, who 
delivered the judgement, held that for the payments to be allowable as 
deductions they must be shown, in terms of section 14(a) of the Income Tax 
Consolidation Act, 1948, to be 'expenditure actually incurred by the employer in 
the production of income'. 
The court was of the opinion that the purpose of the taxpayer must have been to 
increase the productivity, to improve staff morale or loyalty, or to reduce staff 
turnover, all of which would Impact on the production of income. Gratuity 
payments which does no more than reward past service, it would seem, not be 
'incurred in the production of income' and would therefore not be deductible. 
This was in fact the case in W F Johnstone & Co Ltd v CIR 1951 (@) SA 283 (A), 
17 SATC 235, where the company had paid four of its employees lump-sum 
gratuities and paid pension to one of them because they were too old to be 
members of the company's provident fund. These payments were on account of 
old age and honourable services. Judge Centlivres CJ as he then was, who gave 
the judgement felt that the real reason that influenced the directors to make the 
payments was in recognition of past services rendered to the company. 
As such they did not form part of the ordinary operations undertaken by the 
company for the purpose of conducting its business; nor were they payments 
made for the purpose of earning income. Lastly they were not payments made 
wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the appellant's trade. And as such they 
were not deductible. 
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2.2.12 Test of intention 
There are two inquiries that can be made when testing whether an amount is 
incurred in the production of income, namely; 
What was the purpose of incurring the expenditure, that is, was it incurred for 
the purpose of earning income and if this requirement is satisfied, 
Is the expenditure closely connected to the earning of the income? 
Therefore, if the purpose is to earn non-income, that is, dividends, or, to 
preserve capital e.g. to prevent total extinction of the business from which the 
taxpayer's income was derived, then the inquiry closes and the expenditure is 
not deductible. 
In Natal Laeveld Boerdery Bk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste, 60 SATC 
81, the taxpayer was unable to raise the purchase price of a farm as a result he 
borrowed an amount from a financial institution and registered a bond over the 
farm as security. The proceeds of the loan was used to pay the departing 
member. The question before the court was whether the interest paid by the 
taxpayer CC on the loan was deductible by it in terms of section 11(a) read with 
section 23(g) of the income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
The court held that where the deductibility of interest payable on a loan is in 
question, regard must be primarily be had to the purpose or purposes for which 
the money was loaned. The court held that the primary purpose of the loan was 
to buy out one member of the taxpayer CC and in so doing the remaining 
member became the sole member of the taxpayer. The court held further that 
the interest payment in issue was not deductible in terms of section 11(a) read 
with section 23(g) of the Act 58 of 1962. 
In CIR v African Greyhound racing Association (Pty) Ltd, 13 SATC 259, 1945 TPD 
344, the appellant company had sought to deduct expenditure amounting to 
$1586 on legal representation before the commission appointed to enquire into 
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the question whether dog racing should be abolished or curtailed. The 
Commissioner refused to allow this as a deduction and the company approached 
the Supreme Court for a decision. The court held that the expenditure was not 
admissible as a deduction, inasmuch as it was not incurred for the production of 
income, but for the purpose of preventing the total or partial extinction of the 
business from which the appellant's income was derived. 
In CIR v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, 13 SATC 381,1945 CPD 377,the taxpayer 
carried on a business of wine and spirits from the year 1935. The company 
introduced a product, which quickly took on the market, as a result of which the 
opposition tried to sell their wines under the company's label known as the 'Ship 
Sherry'. The company was able to obtain a judgement preventing these 
companies to use that label. However when Castle Wine and Brandy entered the 
market, it brought with it a sherry labeled 'Ship Sherry' and the company's sales 
declined. 
In 1940 Castle Wine and Brandy made an attempt to register this label. 
Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery opposed the application on the grounds that the 
'ship' device had become distinctive of its wines, and the use of the name as a 
trade mark by the applicant company would be calculated to deceive and lead to 
confusion. The Registrar of Patents decided to reject Castle Wine and Brandy's 
application and that led to the sales of Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery's 'sherry' 
increasing. 
In its opposition to this application, Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery incurred legal 
expenses, which it decided to claim as a deduction in the determination of its 
taxable income for that tax year. The Commissioner having disallowed that 
expenditure, the respondent company appealed to the Special Income Tax Court 
against the assessments on the grounds that; 
The expenditure was actually incurred in the production of income 
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The expenditure actually produced income in the year of assessment ended 30th 
June 1942 and in subsequent years; and 
The expenditure was ordinary business expenditure and was not of a capital 
nature. 
The Special court, allowed the respondent company's appeal, but the 
Commissioner, being dissatisfied with this decision, approached the Supreme 
court to overrule the Special Court's decision, submitting for the decision the 
following question of law: "On the facts found as admitted and proved and set 
out herein, was the expenditure incurred by the company, expenditure actually 
incurred in the production within the meaning of section 11 (2)(a) of the Act and 
not excluded from deduction on the ground that it was expenditure of a capital 
nature." 
The court upheld the Commissioner's appeal on the grounds that the expenditure 
was incurred in seeking to nullify competition, which would have affected the 
company's business. The court further held that the legal costs were sufficiently 
closely connected with the earning of the income as to be regarded as part of 
the cost of earning it and so admissible as a deduction. The court also decided 
that as the expenditure was not incurred in the protection of the company's 
label, but was for the purpose of meeting the threat to its business, which had 
proved to be of a recurrent nature, it was not of a capital nature and the 
taxpayer was entitled to claim it as a deduction. 
2.2.13 'Not of a capital nature' 
Section 11(a) stipulates that in order for expenditure or loss to be allowed as a 
deduction, it must not be of a capital nature. The Act does not define the 
expenditure or loss of a capital nature, and as Centlivres JA pointed out, in Sub-
Nigel Ltd v CIR 1948 (4) SA 580 (A), 15 SATC 381, it is impossible to give a 
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definition of a non capital nature which will act as a touchstone in deciding all 
possible cases and it would be impracticable to attempt such a definition. 
Marais J.A., in Rand Mines (Mining & Services) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue 1996, 59 SATC 85, pointed out that the distinction between expenditure 
of a capital nature and expenditure of an income nature is clear enough 
conceptually and so familiar that repetition is unnecessary. According to him the 
problem is to identify and then synthesize into a reasonably accurate and 
universally applicable yardstick the factors which are indicative of each of the 
two classes of expenditure. 
The courts have identified useful indicia to which regard may be had, 
emphasizing that they are no more than that and that in each case close 
attention must be given to its particular facts. Viscount Radcliffe, in 
Commissioner of Taxes v Ntchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (1964) 1 All ER 
208 (PC) at 212B, warned that any of the indicia identified by the Courts, taken 
singly, will always lead to the right conclusion. 
The distinction drawn in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v George Forest 
Timber Co., A.D. 516 at 526, and New State Areas, Ltd v Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue, 1946 A.D. 610 at 627, between capital and revenue expenditure 
is well recognized. In those cases it was said that money spent in creating or 
acquiring an income producing concern, a source of profit or a capital asset, is 
capital expenditure, whilst the cost incidental to the performance of the income 
producing operations is revenue expenditure. 
In New State Areas, Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue, supra, Watermeyer 
O, quoted with approval from Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways Co v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue, supra, that in a literal sense expenditure and 
losses do not produce income. Income is produced by work or services or 
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activities or operations and as a rule expenditure is attendant upon the 
performance of such operations sometimes necessarily, sometimes not. 
Expenditure may be incurred in the purchasing of manufacturing equipment, 
which he uses in the performance of his income earning operations. Both these 
forms of expenditure can be described as expenditure in the production of 
income and the latter is regarded as expenditure of a capital nature. 
In this case the company was appealing against the decision of the 
Commissioner and the Income Tax Special Court, regarding the deductibility of 
expenditure. 
The appellant company carried on business of gold mining. 
In the year 1941 the local authority within whose area of jurisdiction the mine 
lay, required the company to install a system of water-borne sewerage and to 
link up with the authority's system. The company was obliged by the terms of 
Ordinance 17 of 1939 to comply with this requirement. The system installed 
consisted of sewers and connections upon the company's own property and 
sewers upon land outside the company's property linking up the system into the 
authority's own system. The system was installed at the cost of the local 
authority but the company was required to pay; 
"A" basic charge 
The court went on to describe the difference between floating or circulating 
capital and fixed capital. It was said that the capital employed in a business is 
frequently changing its form from money to goods and vice versa, and if this is 
done for the purpose of making a profit, then the capital employed is floating 
capital. 
Expenditure of a capital nature, the deduction of which is prohibited under 
section 11(2), is expenditure of a fixed capital nature, not expenditure of a 
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floating capital nature, because expenditure which constitute the use of floating 
capital for the purpose of earning a profit, such as the purchase price of stock in 
trade in order to arrive at the taxable income derived by the taxpayer from that 
trade, must necessarily be deducted from the proceeds of the sale of stock in 
trade in order to arrive at the taxable income derived by the taxpayer from that 
trade. 
The court in the case in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v George Forest 
Timber Co Ltd 1924, A.D. 516 felt that in the absence of any authoritative and 
comprehensive definition of capital expenditure it is important to know the 
characteristic quality of capital; that it is wealth employed in creating fresh 
wealth, invested to produce income. 
It is common cause that proceeds of merchandise sold in the coarse of trade are 
included in the gross income of trade, because they are not receipts of a capital 
nature within the meaning of section 11(a) of the Act. At the same time, the 
cost of merchandise thus disposed of would be an expenditure not of a capital 
nature within the meaning of section 17(l)(a); and having been incurred in 
producing the income would be properly deducted under that clause. 
The court further held that money spent in creating or acquiring an income 
producing concern must be capital expenditure. There is a great difference 
between money spent in creating or acquiring a source of profit, and the money 
spent in working it. The one is capital expenditure and the other is revenue 
expenditure. The reason is plain; in the one case it is spent to enable the 
concern to yield profits in the future, in the other it is spent in working the 
concern for the present production of profit. 
These opinions have been expressed in a number of cases including Rhodesia 
Railways v Commissioner of Taxes (1925, A.D. 496. 
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In the ordinary cases it is not difficult to distinguish between capital expenditure 
and revenue expenditure, but there are many cases on the borderline, some of 
which, such as repairs and wear and tear of the means of production, are 
specifically provided for in section 11(2) of the Act. 
Several tests for determining the difference between expenditure of an income 
nature and expenditure of a capital nature have also been suggested in the 
English cases. One such case where such a test was suggested was in 
Vallambrosa Rubber Co v Farmer, 1910 SC519 where it was said that a payment 
made once and for all is capital expenditure and a recurrent expenditure is 
revenue expenditure recognizes the form only and not the essential character of 
the transaction and is of little value to those cases where capital expenditure is 
given the appearance of revenue expenditure because it is paid in installments 
and where revenue expenditure is given the appearance of capital expenditure 
because it is commuted and paid in one lump- sum. The English courts do now 
recognize that they have to look at the true character of the transaction and not 
the form. 
In I.R.C. v Mallaby Deeley (1938, A.E.R. 818 at page 823) the court held that the 
distinction to be drawn for the purposes of the Income Tax Acts between 
payments of an income character and payments of a capital nature is sometimes 
a very fine and rather artificial one. It depends upon the precise character of the 
transaction. If the amount to be paid is capital, the fact that that amount will be 
paid in installments will not change what is capital expenditure to be revenue 
expenditure. 
The character of the expenditure to be made is determined by the nature of the 
transaction to be made and that the installment method used does not change 
the character of the transaction. But, where there is no obligation to pay an 
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amount of a capital nature, but an undertaking to pay annual sums, these annual 
payments will be considered to be revenue in nature for the purposes of the 
Income Tax Acts. 
In Vallambrosa Rubber Co v Farmer, 1910 SC 519, the court expressed the 
opinion that capital expenditure is a thing that is going to be spent once and for 
all, and income expenditure is a thing that is going to recur every year. However 
Lord Dunedin emphasized that the criterion suggested was not, intended to be 
decisive in every case. 
According to the court in CIR v African oxygen, Ltd 1963 (1) S.A. 681, money 
spent in creating or acquiring an income producing concern, a source of profit or 
a capital asset, is capital expenditure, while the cost incidental to the 
performance of the income earning operations is revenue expenditure. 
2.2.14 'Laid out or expended for the purpose of trade' 
Section 23(g), the so called negative portion of the deduction formula, prohibits 
as a deduction 'any moneys, claimed as a deduction from income derived from 
trade, to the extent to which such moneys were not laid out or expended wholly 
or exclusively for the purposes of trade'. When deduction of expenditure from 
income is being determined, section 23(g) should be read together with section 
11(a) of the Act. 
Prior to its amendment in 1992, section 23(g) prohibited the deduction of 
expenditure, which was not laid out wholly and exclusively for the purposes of 
trade. The previous provision of section 23(g) was much more restrictive than 
the present version, in that, where expenditure was not wholly and exclusively 
laid out for the purposes of trade, the deduction was disallowed. 
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This problem was highlighted in an appeal court case in Solaglas Finance 
Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1991 AD, 53 SATC 1, in which the court held that a loss 
suffered as a result of a loan debt from a fellow subsidiary which went bad, was 
not deductible because, the loan had been made with mixed motives, namely, 
the carrying on of a money lending business (trade) and for the purpose of 
benefiting the group (non-trade). 
The non-trade element was the reason for disallowance of the deduction 
because it meant that the expenditure was not wholly and exclusively laid out for 
the purposes of trade. According to the court in Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue v Pick n' Pay Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd 49 SATC 132 1987 (3) SA 453 (A), 
section 23(g) as amended in 1992 reads as follows: 
Section 23 No deductions shall in any case be made in respect of the 
following matters, namely 
(g) 'Any moneys claimed as a deduction from income derived from 
trade, to the extent to which such moneys were not laid out or 
expended for the purposes on trade'. 
In this case the court first concerned itself with the meaning of the words, 
'moneys which are wholly or exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade' 
According to the court the answer to this question was provided by the analysis 
of similar words in the judgement of Romer U in Bentleys, Stokes and Lowless v 
Beeson (1952) 33 TC 491 (CA) at 503-4 where it was said that: 
"The question whether the deduction of expenditure is allowable in terms of 
section 23(g) is a question of law, however the purpose of the taxpayer in 
incurring the expenditure is a question of fact (SIR v Ineson 1980 (3) SA 852 
(A), 42 SATC 125). In a United Kingdom case, the words 'expended for the 
purposes of trade' in section 23(g) was considered and the courts there 
interpreted them to mean 'for the purposes of enabling a person to carry on and 
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earn profits in the trade' (Strong & Co of Romsey Ltd v Woodifield (Surveyor of 
Taxes (1906) AC 448, 5 TC 215." 
2.2.15 Private and domestic expenditure 
Section 23 prohibits the expenditure of the following: 
(a) The cost incurred in the maintenance of any taxpayer, his family or 
establishment. 
(b) Domestic and private expenses, including the rent of or cost of repairs of 
or expenses in connection with premises not occupied for the purposes of trade 
or of any dwelling house or domestic premises except in respect of such part as 
may be occupied for the purposes of trade. 
Provided that: 
• (a) Such part shall not be deemed to have been occupied for the 
purposes of trade, unless such part is specifically equipped for the 
purposes of the taxpayer's trade and regularly and exclusively used for 
such purposes; and 
• No deduction shall in any event be granted where the taxpayer's trade 
constitute any employment or office unless; 
> His income from such employment or office is derived mainly from 
commission or other variable payments which are based on the 
taxpayer's work performance and his duties are mainly performed 
otherwise than in an office which is provided to him by his 
employment; or 
> His duties are mainly performed in such part" 
Huxham and Haupt in Notes On Income Tax In South Africa (2004) explains that 
expenditure such as bond interest, repairs to domestic dwellings, domestic 
servants' wages and cost of running a private motor vehicle are all disallowed 
under these sub-sections. Subparagraph (a) of the proviso to section 23(b) does 
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make provision of expenditure incurred in respect of any portion of a private 
dwelling occupied exclusively and regularly for the purpose of trade. 
A full-time salaried employee will not be permitted a deduction in respect of a 
home office, in terms of subparagraph (b) to the proviso to section 23(b), unless 
his income is derived mainly from commission and his work is mainly performed 
otherwise than in office provided by his employer or his duties are mainly 
performed in his office. It is submitted that if an employee also carries on some 
other trade he will still be entitled to a deduction if he uses his home office 
regularly and exclusively for the purposes of that trade. 
In L v Commissioner of Taxes (1992) 54 SATC 91 (ZHC) a taxpayer developed 
cataracts in her eyes, which caused the deterioration of her eyesight resulting 
her undergoing surgery in South Africa. After the operation she was able to 
resume her duties. In connection with her medical treatment in South Africa, 
she incurred expenditure to the tune of $4200, on air tickets, accommodation, 
the hire of car, medical treatment and hospital and drugs charges. She claimed 
these expenses as expenditure incurred for the purposes of her trade. 
The court was of the view that the expenditure incurred by the taxpayer, could 
not be said to have been closely connected to the performance of a taxpayer's 
legal practice, as to be regarded as part of the cost of performing it. Judge Smith 
J, who presided over the court proceedings quoted from Norman v Golder 
(Inspector of Taxes) 1945,1 All ER 352 (CA) at 354, where Lord Greene MR said, 
"It is quite impossible to argue that a doctor's bills represent money wholly and 
exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade, profession employment or vocation 
of the patient. 
True it is that if you do not get yourself well and so incur expenses to doctors 
you cannot carry on your trade or profession, and if you do not carry on your 
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trade or profession you will not earn an income, and if you do not earn an 
income, the Revenue will not get any tax. The same thing applies to the food 
you it and the clothes you wear. But expenses of that kind are not wholly and 
exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade, profession or vocation. 
They are paid out in part for the advantage and benefit of the taxpayer as a 
living human being. Paragraph (b) of the rule equally would exclude doctor's 
bills, because they are, in my opinion, expenses of maintenance of the party, his 
family or a sum expended for the domestic or private purpose, distinct from the 
purpose of the trade or profession". 
In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Hickson (1960 (1) SA 746), the 
respondent had incurred a spinal injury and was only able to move with 
considerable difficulty. In 1955 he was asked by his company to visit Britain and 
America for a series of business meetings. As he could not travel unassisted, the 
company agreed to finance his wife who was going to look after his during that 
journey. In his income tax return for the tax year ended 30th June 1956, the 
respondent claimed deduction of his wife's expenses on the trip. 
The Commissioner rejected the claim for deduction but in the Special Court, it 
was held that the expenditure was actually incurred in the production of income, 
that it was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade and was not 
prohibited by the provisions of section 12 of the Income Tax Act which disallow 
expenditure on the 'maintenance of the taxpayer, his family or establishment' or 
on the 'domestic and private expenses' of the taxpayer. 
The Commissioner appealed direct to the Appellate division of the Supreme 
Court. In its judgement, the court explained the reasoning behind section 
ll(2)(q) of the Act, which allows as a deduction * in respect of any person 
suffering from any disability, and the sum of whose taxable income and 
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dividends, for the year of assessment in question does not exceed one thousand 
five hundred pounds, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
section 12, so much of any expenditure, but not exceeding one hundred and fifty 
pounds, incurred by such a person during the year of assessment as the 
Commissioner is satisfied was necessarily incurred by him in consequence of 
such disability and for the purpose of carrying on of his trade and which is not 
such expenditure as is referred to in any of the other paragraphs of this 
subsection' 
The court's opinion with regards to this paragraph was that it merely permits, 
within limits, a deduction of expenses which would otherwise not be allowable 
because of the provisions of subsection (a) and (b) of section 12, i.e. either 
because they are incurred in maintaining the taxpayer or are of a domestic or 
private nature. The object of adding this paragraph to the other paragraphs in 
subsection (2) of section 11 was, probably, to afford a certain class of taxpayer 
some further and additional relief. 
In conclusion the court felt that the expenses claimed by the respondent were 
not of the kind contemplated and prohibited by subsections (a) and (b) of 
section 12 of the Act. According to the court, 'maintenance of the taxpayer, his 
family or establishment' means feeding and clothing himself and his family, 
providing them with the necessities of life, and comforts, and, maintaining a 
certain standard of living, and keeping up his establishment. 'Domestic and 
private expenses' are, according the court, expenses pertaining to the household, 
and to the taxpayer's private life as opposed to his life as a trader. 
2.2.16 Cessation of trade 
In ITC 729 (1951) 18 SATC 96, the taxpayer continued paying his employees 
pension long after the business stopped operating. The taxpayer sought to 
deduct these amounts paid as having been incurred for the purposed of trade. 
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The court held that, because the obligations were incurred for the purposes of 
trade, the actual expenditure satisfied the requirements of the provisions 
equivalent to section 23(g) and was therefore deductible from income derived 
from another trade. The court further held that it is not the requirement of 
section 23(g) that a particular trade in respect of which the expenditure has 
been laid out be in existence at the date the expenditure is incurred 
In Income Tax Case No 1029, reference was made to the Australian case of 
Amalgamated Zinc (De Bavay's) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxes (1935) 54 
C.L.R. 295, as reported in ITC No 490. In that case it was decided that 
expenditure incurred by the taxpayer as a result of operation which it had ceased 
to carry on after it had so ceased to carry on the operations, could not be 
regarded as 'losses and outgoings incurred in gaining or producing assessable 
income'. 
The court, however pointed out that, as the Australian legislation is different from 
ours, so would be our approach in South Africa due to the legislation that is 
different to Australians'. The court held that if the expenditure was deductible, by 
a taxpayer while he carried on business, the fact that he ceased to carry on that 
business did not render such expenditure non-deductible provided that it arose 
out of the taxpayer's activities prior to the cessation of his business operations. 
Not wholly and exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade 
In Pick n' Pay Wholesalers (Pry) Ltd 49 SATC 132 1987 (3) SA 453 (A) the court 
was trying to establish the status of the donation to Urban Foundation by the 
appellant company. Part of the donation was regarded by the Commissioner as 
being not wholly or exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade and as such no 
deduction was permissible. 
The court had to examine the meaning of section 23(g), in particular the words ' 
moneys which are not wholly or exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade'. 
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Judge Nicholas AJA, who presided over the court proceedings, referred the case, 
'Bentleys, stokes and Lowless v Beeson (1952) 33 TC 491 (CA) at 503-4 and 
said: 
"The relevant words... 'wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the 
purposes of the profession' appear straight forward enough. It is conceded that 
the first adverb "wholly" is in reference to the quantum of the money expended 
and has no relevance to the present case. 
The sole question is whether the expenditure in question was "exclusively" laid 
out for business purposes, that is: What was the motive or object in mind of the 
two individuals responsible for the activities in question? It is well established 
that the question is one of fact: and again, therefore, the problem seems simple 
enough. The difficulty, however, arises, as we think, from the nature of the 
activities in question. Entertainment involves inevitably the characteristic of 
hospitality: giving to charity or subscribing to a staff pension fund involves 
inevitably the object of benefaction: an undertaking to guarantee to a limited 
amount a national exhibition involves inevitably supporting that exhibition and the 
purposes for which it has been organized. 
But the question in all such cases is: Was the entertainment, the charitable 
subscription, the guarantee, undertaken solely for the purposes of business, that 
is, solely with the object of promoting the business or its profit making capacity? 
It is, as we have said, a question of fact. 
And it is quite clear that the purpose must be the sole purpose. The paragraph 
says so in clear terms. If the activity is undertaken with the object both of 
promoting the business and also with some other purpose, for example, with an 
object of indulging an independent wish of entertaining a friend or stranger or of 
supporting a charitable or benevolent object, then the paragraph is not satisfied 
though in mind of the actor the business motive may predominate. For the 
statute so prescribes. Per contra, if, in truth, the sole object is business 
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promotion, the expenditure is not disqualified because the nature of the activity 
necessarily involves some other result, or the attainment or furtherance of some 
other objective, since the latter result or objective is necessarily inherent in the 
act" 
In this case the company had made a donation of R500,000 to Urban Foundation 
over a period of five years. According to the witnesses in the court the donation 
was to benefit Urban Foundation while at the same time promoting the 
appellant's business. The Commissioner had contended, in the Special Court, 
that 
• The two amounts of R100.000 in issue were of a capital nature 
• Neither was "wholly or exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of 
trade" 
• Alternatively and in any event, the R100,000 paid in 1979 tax year 'did not 
constitute expenditure actually incurred in the production of income and/or 
was not wholly or exclusively laid out for purposes of trade. 
The contention of behalf of Pick n' Pay was that the donation was merely a 
vehicle which it used to ride to publicity and profits and that the benefit to the 
Urban Foundation was incidental. The court had to decide whether the 
expenditure was exclusively for the purpose of trade but produced incidental 
effect, or the secondary consequence, of benefit to Urban Foundation or whether 
it had the dual purpose of promoting trade and benefiting the Urban Foundation. 
The court held that there existed a dual purpose, namely, a purpose to make a 
benefaction to the Urban Foundation and a purpose to promote the business of 
Pick n' Pay by publicity which was to be obtained from the announcement of the 
benefaction. Section 23(g) at that time, disallowed expenditure which had been 
laid out for a dual purpose, one being a trading purpose and the other for non 
trading purpose and the expenditure on trade could not be separated and 
identified. 
46 
The words "wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of the 
trade", were considered by the House of Lords in Mallalieu v Drummond 
(Inspector of Taxes) (1983) 2 All ER 1095. In that case a female lawyer was 
claiming deduction from expenditure incurred by her in the replacement, cleaning 
and laundering of certain items of clothing, which she wore in court. 
In considering the words of the tax provision, Lord Brightman said at 1099 e-f 
that they mean 'expended to serve the purposes of the trade or for the purpose 
of enabling a person to carry on and earn profits in the trade. According to the 
court, the effect of the word 'exclusively' is to preclude a deduction if it appears 
that the expenditure was not only to serve the purposes of the trade, profession 
or vocation of the taxpayer but also to serve some other purposes. Such other 
purposes if found to exist, will usually be the private purpose of the taxpayer. 
In Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner For Inland Revenue 53 
SATC 1991 (2) SA 257 (A) the court had to determine circumstances where 
expenditure can be said to be affected by the provisions of section 23(g). The 
court suggested that the answer to that question could be found by analyzing the 
particular facts of the case, namely, 
• By examining the nature of the activities carried on 
• The nature of the expenditure, and, 
• The closeness of the connection between the expenditure and the benefit 
derived there from by the group. 
The appellant company was formed with the object of lending money to any 
person or company and to borrow such monies as it deemed fit. Any company in 
the group that wanted finance would approach the appellant, who in turn would 
provide the necessary funds by way of loans. The appellant's sole business 
consisted of borrowing moneys and utilizing the moneys so acquired for making 
loans but only to companies in the group, to staff members and customers of 
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trading companies in the group. In submitting its income tax return for the tax 
year in question, the appellant sought to deduct losses sustained on loans which 
had become irrecoverable. 
The appellant contended that it was conducting the business of a banker or 
money lender or a business 'sufficiently similar to and analogous with' such a 
business, and the losses were accordingly losses of floating or circulating capital 
and were thus deductible in terms of section 11(a) of the Act. The appellant 
further contended that because section 23(g) did not refer in terms to 'losses', as 
did section 11(a), the Legislature did not intend section 23(g) to apply to the 
deduction of 'losses' at all, and, since the appellant was clear claiming a 
deduction of 'losses' and nothing else, its claim could not be barred by section 
23(g). 
The appellant further contended that although it may have been brought into 
operation for the purpose of promoting the interest of the group, when it 
commenced, and thereafter continued its trading activities, it did so for the sole 
purpose of serving its own interest by earning profit, and not with the purpose of 
advancing the group's purpose. 
The promotion of the Group interest was merely a motive of the appellant in 
carrying on its trade, and not a purpose of it. The appellant further submitted that 
the promotion of the group interest was merely the appellant's 'subjective 
intention' and not the 'objective purpose' of its trading activities and that the 
promotion of the group interest was not a 'purpose' of the appellant's trade, but 
merely an 'effect' of it, or a 'result'. 
The respondent had contended that the appellant was not conducting the 
business of a banker or money-lender, it was merely carrying on an 
administrative business and its income was derived from managerial functions it 
performed in the course thereof. 
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Judge Friedman AJA listed various guidelines that have been laid down for the 
determination of the question whether a taxpayer can be said to be carrying on 
business on a money-lender or banker, namely; 
• There must be an intention to lend to all and sundry provided they are, 
from his point of view, eligible. 
• The lending must be done on a system or plan which discloses a degree 
of continuity in laying out and getting back the capital for further use and 
which involves a frequent turnover of the capital. 
• The obtaining of security is a usual, though not essential, feature of a loan 
made in the course of a money tending business. 
• The fact that money has on several occasions been lent at remunerative 
rates of interest, is not enough to show that the business of money lending 
is being carried on; there must be a certain degree of continuity and 
system about the transactions. 
• The proportion of income from loans to the total income: the smallness of 
the proportions cannot, however, be decisive if the other essential 
elements of a money lending business exist. 
The court held that 
• The losses in question incurred by the appellant as a result of loans made 
by it in the course of its business becoming irrecoverable were disqualified 
from the deduction by reason of the provisions of section 23(g). 
• The legislature did intend section 23(g) to apply to the deduction of 
'losses' 
• The wording of section 23(g) contains the requirement that any moneys 
sought to be deducted must be moneys 
> Which are laid out or expended and 
> Wholly and exclusively for the purposes of trade 
• The requirements described above in no way touches upon the question 
whether moneys which are laid out or expended have been lost or not; 
that is immaterial for the purpose of the section, according to its wording. 
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• The monies which are laid out or expended are decreed in terms of 
section 23(g) not being deductible if they are not laid out or expended in 
the manner required: there being nothing in the section to support the 
argument that the prohibition did not apply when moneys which are laid 
out or expended happen to result in losses. 
• Section 11 (a) provides positively for what may be deducted and section 
23(g) negatively for what may not, but there is no direct correlation 
between the one and the other. 
• The inquiries under the two sections (i.e. ss 11(a) and 23(g)) are notionally 
and logically discrete; section 11(a) is concerned with the deduction of 
'expenditure' qua expenditure and the deduction of 'losses' qua losses, 
while section 23(g) focuses on the deduction of 'moneys' qua moneys. 
• For the deduction claimed by the appellant to pass the test of section 
23(g), it must be shown that the amounts of the loans made by the 
appellant were wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the 
purposes of trade. 
• There are no hard and fast rules for deciding whether a taxpayer's 
expenditure falls within or outside the ambit of section 23(g); it being not 
possible to devise any precise universal test for determining whether 
expenditure comprises moneys 'exclusively laid out or expended for the 
purposes of trade; in general, one can say no more than that the issue is 
to be resolved by examining the particular facts of each individual case. 
• That on the facts, the appellant's trading activities were geared to the 
achievement of a dual purpose: furthering the interests of the group's 
subsidiaries and thus of the Group itself; and making a profit for the 
appellant. 
• The trading activities of the appellant are governed by the policy 
considerations dictated by the interests of the Group. 
• In the context of section 23(g) what calls for determination is the 
relationship of that business vis-a-vis the promotion of the group interests, 
on the one hand, and the making of a profit, on the other. 
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• The connection between the expenditure in the form of loans and the 
benefit to the group is both direct and immediate; in these circumstances 
the benefit falls within the ambit of the word 'purpose' in section 23(g). 
• The link between the appellant's activities and the furthering of the group's 
interests was sufficiently close, on the evidence, to cause the latter to fall 
within the ambit of the word 'purpose' as used in section 23(g) 
• Section 23(g) precluded the claimed deductions. 
2.2.18 Apportionment of expenditure 
It does happen sometimes that some items of expenditure are laid out with mixed 
motives. A taxpayer who carries on more than one trade may incur a lump-sum 
expenditure for the benefit of his different trades. A company might pay 
remuneration to its director and only a portion might be laid out for the purpose of 
earning income as defined in section 1 of the Act and partly for the purposes of 
earning exempt income. An expenditure may be incurred partly for the purposes 
of earning income and partly for acquiring a fixed asset for the business. 
Discrete amounts expended for different separately identifiable purposes do not 
require to be apportioned, and their eligibility for deduction can be judged on their 
merits. 
In the case, Secretary For Inland Revenue v Guardian Assurance Holdings (SA) 
Ltd 38 SATC 111, 1976 (4) SA 522 (A), the company had deliberately influenced 
over subscription of shares in order to make extra interest by keeping excess 
application money in the bank for about a month. The interest earned amounted 
to R616 049, which the respondent reflected in its income tax return for the year 
ended 31s t December 1968. The respondent claimed a deduction of R98 085, 
being expenditure incurred in earning the aforesaid interest of R616 085. 
The Secretary refused to allow any portion of the said R98 085 as a deduction on 
the grounds that the expenditure was of a capital nature. The Secretary further 
submitted that the expenditure incurred was one indivisible, in the sense that 
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every bit of it was incurred for the purposes of raising capital, whereas only a 
portion of it was incurred for income purposes. Further the appellant contended 
that the operation and expenditure had two motives, one being the raising of 
capital and the other the earning of income, thus the expenditure could not be 
dissected and allocated to the different objects. 
The appellant further cast doubt as to whether, for the purposes of income tax, 
there could be any apportionment on any basis of expenditure incurred, the 
reason being that, inasmuch as the expenditure in question was incurred for a 
dual purpose, there was a 'capital element' in every item of the expenditure 
incurred, which meant that the expenditure was of a capital nature and therefore 
not deductible under section 11 (a) of the Act. The other contention was that of 
section 23(g) of the Act, which requires that expenditure, in order to qualify for 
deduction, must be 'wholly or exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of 
trade' 
Apportionment is possible and applicable where a single, indivisible expenditure 
has been laid out for more than a single purpose. In Local Investment Co v 
Commissioner of Taxes (SR), 1958 (3) SA 34 case, it was held that in a business 
where expenses can readily and accurately be appropriated to 'income' and non-
taxable amounts the application of the section 23 does not present any difficulty. 
However, in many, if not most, businesses, there are bound to be expenses of a 
general character, which cannot be accurately appropriated either to 'income' or 
to non-income amounts. 
The proper way, according to the court, to deal with such expenses, is to make a 
fair and reasonable apportionment of these expenses as between 'income' and 
non-taxable amounts. The fact that the Act does not make any special provision 
for apportionment in such a case is no argument for holding that either 'all' or 
'none' of the general expenses may be deducted. In the absence of a specific 
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direction from the Act, apportionment seems to be the only proper way to deal 
with such expenses. 
According to the court in ITC No 1589 1993, the objective, when applying 
apportionment, is to reach a solution which is fair and reasonable in the 
circumstances of the particular case and if the taxpayer is not satisfied with 
apportionment made by the Commissioner of Taxes, the onus is on the taxpayer 
to establish that apportionment is not fair and reasonable. 
Judge Corbett JA, in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 45 
SATC 241, 1983 (4) SA 935 (A), defined apportionment as a device which has 
previously been resorted to where expenditure in a globular sum has been 
incurred by a taxpayer for two purposes, one of which qualifies for deduction and 
the other does not. He further suggested that apportionment is a practical 
solution to what otherwise could be an intractable problem and in a situation 
where the only other answers, viz disallowance of the whole amount of 
expenditure or allowance of the whole thereof, would produce an inequity or 
anomaly one way or the other. 
In making such an apportionment the court considers what would be fair and 
reasonable in all circumstances. In Tuck v Commissioner For Inland Revenue 50 
SATC 98, 1988 (3) SA 819 (A), the court defined apportionment as a sensible 
and practical solution to the problem which arises when a taxpayer receives a 
single receipt and the quid pro quo contains two or more separate elements, one 
or more of which would characterize it as capital. 
The court then suggested that a taxpayer is entitled to make an apportionment, 
if it is possible for him to do so. I t is also competent for the Commissioner to 
make such apportionment, either himself or in consultation with the taxpayer, if 
he has the necessary data to enable him to do so. If neither the taxpayer, nor 
53 
the Commissioner has made any allocation, it is still open to the court to do so if 
the necessary evidence is available to enable the court to make such allocation. 
The court thereupon laid down the principle of law with regards to 
apportionment of expenditure as follows: that where a lump-sum expenditure is 
sought to be deducted from one's taxable income, that sum must have been 
wholly or exclusively expended for the purposes of trade. If portion of such 
lump-sum was so laid out and portion was not and if it is not possible to allocate 
each portion to its appropriate purpose, then no portion of the lump-sum can be 
deducted. 
But if the lump-sum can be dissected and that portion expended for the 
purposes of trade can be identified, such portion may be deducted. This is 
plainly the effect of the decisions. There is nothing in the section prohibiting 
such allocation and, it is in accordance with common sense. The allocation can 
be made in various ways, namely, on a time basis, or perhaps (in a proper case 
where the facts justify it) on a piece-work basis. 
The question of how apportionment should be made was also raised in Local 
Investment Co v C.O.T. (SR) 1958 (3) SA 34, where the Commissioner to 
exclude a portion of the general expenses as being expended in the production 
of non taxable expenses. The court, citing Gunn's Commonwealth Income Tax 
Law and Practice, 4th ed., p. 375, held that it is a question of fact, depending 
upon the particular circumstances of each case, and the question of fact being to 
make a fair apportionment to each object of the company's actual expenditure, 
where items are not themselves referable to one object or the other. 
The court, however declined to lay down the general rules as to how 
apportionment must be made, other than that it must be fair and reasonable, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case. The court gave an example 
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of one case where an apportionment based on the proportion which the different 
types of income bear to the total income, might be proper, as was done in Rand 
Selections Corporation's case. 
In another case, however, such an apportionment might be grossly unfair: for 
example, in the case where bulk of the expenditure was clearly devoted 
exclusively to operations intended to earn income, but which unfortunately in 
fact earned very little income, with the result that in the particular year of 
assessment the company earned very little 'income' but from the operation which 
incurred little expense earned relatively large taxable amounts. 
In such a case to apportion the bulk of the expenses to the non taxable amounts 
would be unfair. In another case a fair method of apportionment might be to 
take the proportion, which the capital invested in the operations earning the non-
taxable amount bears to the total capital invested, as was done in ITC No 832 of 
1956. 
Section 23(g) of the previous version, have had the effect of preventing 
apportionment of expenditure not wholly or exclusively incurred for the purposes 
of trade. This was confirmed in ITC 699, where the appellant had undertaken a 
trip abroad to open a diamond brokerage business, and in the process incurred 
expenses. In normal circumstances he would have expected that the 
Commissioner would allow expenses incurred in the operation of his business 
together with traveling expenses abroad to open the brokerage business. 
The difficulty confronting the appellant, according to the court, was that the Act 
did not allow the deduction from income of expenditure that was not wholly or 
exclusively incurred for the purposes of earning that income. The appellant's 
evidence showed that he went overseas to open his diamond brokerage business 
and he also gave evidence that his other intention was to open an export/ import 
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business. The court held that where some of the money is expended for a dual 
purpose and one of those purposes would not qualify the expenditure for 
deduction from income for tax purposes, it seems that no portion of the amount 
expended may be so deducted. 
No doubt the reason for this provision, according to the court, is because it 
would open up very difficult inquiries if amounts expended in this way had to be 
dissected, and would throw the Commissioner for Inland Revenue and the Court, 
which has to deal with income tax matters, an almost impossible burden. The 
simple provision is, therefore, made that the expenditure must be wholly and 
exclusively incurred in the production of the income, which is under 
consideration. 
Price J, President of Transvaal Income Tax Special Court, in ITC No 800, quoted 
Case No 4309 1947, where the court held that a sum paid initially as allocated to 
diverse purposes may be treated in its original divisions. Where it is expended 
for mixed purposes and in unallocated quantities, the words of the section forbid 
its dissection or deduction of any part thereof from income. The court however 
had some reservations about this suggestion because of the fact that section 
12(g) does not forbid the dissection of a lump-sum of expenditure proportionately 
into sums each allocated to different items of income if this can be done. 
The court has in the past made such allocations in various cases. Section 12(g) 
provides that 'any moneys claimed as a deduction from income derived from 
trade which are not wholly or exclusively laid our or expended for the purposes of 
trade' may not be deducted from income. There is nothing said in this section 
about dissection. The court made an illustration, where assuming definite sums 
can be allocated as representing the cost to the appellant company of the 
technical services rendered to it by the " I " company such sums would properly 
rank for deduction. 
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But as regards any expenditure represented by the contribution by the appellant 
company to the " I " company towards the cost of its research work, such latter 
cost would be in admissible as being too remotely connected with the production 
of the appellant company's income: further as being of a capital nature; as also 
as not having been wholly and exclusively laid out in the appellant company's 
trade. 
In an unreported Case No 4863, 1950, at page 5, the court held that, where 
expenditure was incurred by a taxpayer, in order to acquire an asset, that 
expenditure was of a capital nature, as the expenditure was incurred for the 
purposes of acquiring an income producing machine. The court cited ITC 703, 
1950, which was reported in 17 SATC 208, where a salary of $1014 paid by way 
of shares to a firm of technical engineers, for a particular tax year was 
apportioned to capital expenditure and expenditure to earn income. 
The court relied upon the test laid down in New State Areas case, 1946 AD 610 
at 627 (13 SATC 400) where it was said that the true nature of each transaction 
should be looked into and that this was in each case a matter of fact. The true 
nature of the transaction, the Court concluded, was not only the establishment of 
the factory but the provision of technical advice for its successful operation over a 
period of ten years. The firm was engaged for approximately eleven months in 
establishing a factory and for approximately one month in operating the factory 
for profit. The court apportioned $910 to capital expenditure and $104 to 
expenditure deductible from income. 
Cases Nos 4545, (1949) and No 4749,(1950), establish the proposition that 
where a lump-sum is expended in respect of different items of expenditure, some 
categories whereof would be deductible from income and some of which would 
not be deductible, and the amounts falling into these different categories cannot 
be identified, nothing at all can be deducted from the taxable income. 
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In the ordinary coarse of events, where income is derived more or less uniformly 
during the whole course of the year, no question arises as to the right to deduct 
expenditure in payment expenses for business purposes, or expenditure in 
payment of interest on monies borrowed for investment in the business. 
There are cases where deduction of expenditure become an issue, namely 
• Where such payments are antecedent to the production of any income; 
• Where a period intervenes due to some external cause during which no 
income is produced; 
• Where, owing to the business ceasing to function or becoming 
unprofitable, no further income is derived; 
• Or where the expenditure overlaps the tax year, being partly attributable to 
a prior year or to a succeeding year. 
The case, Income Tax Case No 130 (4 SATC 130), interest was paid on monies 
borrowed and constituted preliminary expenditure prior to the earning of income, 
the asset not having reached the income producing stage. The court disallowed 
the deduction. 
Expenditure incurred prior to the commencement of the business of the taxpayer 
is not allowable, and this was conformed in the case of ITC No 607 1945, where 
the taxpayer was seeking deduction for expenditure incurred during the period 
where no income was received. In that case, the court was confronted by the 
taxpayer who demanded deduction on expenditure incurred on rates and on 
interest on loan, the portion of which was used to finance building expenses. The 
Commissioner's ground for disallowing deductions were that prior to the date of 
the completion of the building no income was receivable. 
The other contention was that the expenditure on rates, though paid on a lump-
sum during the tax year, should be disallowed in respect of the period during 
which no income was received or receivable. With regards to interest, until 
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money borrowed was actually utilized either in payment of the cost of the 
building or as regards the portion thereof till it was re-lent to the principal share-
holder, the interest on such money lying idle could not be regarded as expended 
in the production of income. 
Normally, there would be no problem, where income is derived more or less 
uniformly during the whole course of the year, and no question arises as to right 
to deduct expenditure in payment of expenses on assets used for business 
purposes, or expenditure in payment of interest on monies borrowed for 
investment in the business. However, problems do arise in cases; 
• Where such payments are antecedent to the production of income, as 
illustrated in the case, 'Income Tax Cases No 130 (4 SATC 130) where 
interest was paid on monies borrowed and constituted preliminary 
expenditure prior to the earning of income, the asset not having reached 
the income producing stage. The deduction of expenditure incurred, was 
refused by the court in that case. 
• Where a period intervenes due to some external cause during which no 
income is produced. This can be illustrated by the case, Income Tax 
Cases No 318 (8 SATC 174) where a break of six months in the earning of 
income occurred through rebuilding operations. The court upheld the 
Commissioner's decision to disallow the expenditure on rates during the 
period of unproductiveness. 
• Where, owing to the business ceasing to function or becoming 
unprofitable, no further income is derived, as was the case in the cases, 
Income Tax Case No 1 (1 SATC 48) and Income Tax Case No 19 (1 SATC 
130). 
• Where expenditure overlaps the tax year, being partly attributable to a 
prior year or to a succeeding year as was illustrated in the case ^Income 
Tax Case No 73 (3 SATC 64). The court in this case held that where an 
appellant became the owner of certain premises from the 1st April, 1925, 
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and as owner he became liable to pay rates levied for the twelve months 
ended the 31st December, 1925, payment of which fell due in April in each 
year, the Commissioner was correct in apportioning the expenditure on 
rates, to the period of the tax year, that is a quarter, during which the 
appellant ha derived income from the property. 
As regards an insurance premium, paid to cover the period of twelve months, 
the court held that, though the payment was a lump-sum, it must bear a 
distinct relation to the profit earned and that as the profit was earned in the 
three months' period, the cover as far as the expenditure was concerned, 
must be limited to three months. 
The same system of apportionment over particular years was approved by 
Russell C.J. in Building Contractor v Commissioner of Taxes (1941, SRLR, 12 SA 
Tax Cases 182). In this case a building was erected in order to derive a rental 
income. While it is not rent producing or regarded as a lettable proposition, we 
cannot not state that the interest, which is paid on the mortgage, in respect of 
the property, is an amount which is incurred in the production of income. When 
it does reach a stage of earning revenue from rent, or has become a lettable 
proposition, then it is possible to set that interest off. 
In this case the court held that, "The underlying principles laid down by these 
decisions is that the expenditure, the deduction of which is claimed, must be 
linked to the income that is earned; and where it is possible to apportion the 
expenditure to the income so earned such apportionment must be made; and 
that the expenditure which cannot be so linked and apportioned must be 
disallowed. Further, that where the expenditure overlaps the tax year a similar 
apportionment must take place. 
It is true that the Act itself contains no provisions for such apportionments, but it 
may be regarded as to be implied from the terms of section ll(2)(a), which 
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permits only the deduction of such expenditure as actually incurred in the 
production of the income. The court is of the opinion that, in view of the above 
decisions and rulings laid down by more than one President of the high court 
previously, the maxim sum decisis should be applied and that the right of the 
Commissioner to make an apportionment in suitable cases should be upheld". 
Time based apportionment was also used by the court in Borstlap v Sekretaris 
van Binnelandse Inkomste, 1981 (4) SA 836,where the taxpayer had claimed a 
deduction of expenditure in the form of interest on the bond, insurance 
premiums and municipal rates on property, incurred for the whole year. The 
court, in regard to the deductibility of expenditure claimed by the appellant held 
that, " The items disallowed by the Commissioner were disallowed because for a 
proportionate period in respect of which the expenditure was incurred, the 
building was in the course of erection and was not an asset which could be used 
to let and to produce income, and that the expenditure, therefore, was of a 
preliminary or capital nature. 
It seems to me clear that until the asset becomes an asset capable of producing 
income, any expenditure upon it is of a preliminary nature and it is not 
deductible, because the rates and interest were not laid out exclusively or at all, 
in point of fact, for the purposes of trade. If a taxpayer has no asset with which 
he can trade, then he cannot be trading. That seems to me to be simple, logical 
statement, and it seems to me that it is the simple logical statement, which 
determines the issue in this case. 
During the period in respect of which the rates and interest were disallowed the 
taxpayer had no assets with which he could trade and he was not trading, and if 
he was not trading the expenditure was not incurred in the production of 
income. The expenditure was incurred in the creation or equipment of an asset, 
which was intended to be used at a later stage, for the purposes of earning 
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income. It was initial or preliminary expenditure designed to extend the scope of 
the business or to improve its earning capacity. It was money spent in an 
attempt to create a source or to acquire an advantage for the benefit of the 
business which was later to be undertaken". 
The court in this case was of the view that the expenditure incurred by the 
taxpayer had a dual motive, the first being to obtain income by letting and the 
second motive was the acquisition and retention of a capital asset for future 
development, with the latter being the main objective. The court conceded that 
the Act does not provide any direction with regards apportionment of 
expenditure in cases where the taxpayer has paid a global amount in respect of 
items which are partially within and partially without the ambit of the general 
deduction formula of the Act. In practice such a division is sometimes permitted 
and recognized by the courts when it can be shown that particular items are 
closely associated with the production of income, the overall criterion being what 
is fair and reasonable on the particular facts. 
The court then rejected the suggestion by the appellant to divide the amount of 
expenditure on a time basis since that would be incorrect to take into account 
the full interest on the bond and associated insurance premiums over the five 
months of the tax year during which the property was let because such interest 
and premiums had been paid with dual objectives of (a) obtaining of income by 
letting and (b) the acquisition and retention of a capital asset for future 
development. 
Apportionment was also use In CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA (A), 45 
SATC 241, because the court had concluded that the expenditure incurred by 
Nemojim in the acquisition of shares had a dual purpose, viz the receipt of 
moneys on resale which would constitute income in Nemojim's hands and the 
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receipt of a dividend after the declaration thereof, which would constitute 
exempt income in Nemojim's hands. 
The facts of the case was that Nemojim laid out moneys expended on the 
acquisition of the shares in various dormant companies in question, with a dual 
purpose. The one purpose was to receive dividends from the companies and 
these dividends were exempt from income in Nemojim's hands. The other 
purpose was to receive the proceeds of the shares on resale and these proceeds 
were income in Nemojim's hands. 
Nemojim included the proceeds of the sale of shares in its gross income, and 
claimed a deduction for the purchase price of the shares. The deduction of 
expenditure from income can only be effected if the expenditure passes the dual 
test of qualifying for deduction in terms of section 11(a) and, at the same time, 
of not being excluded by section 23(f). The court was of the opinion that the 
expenditure did not wholly pass either test. Because one of the purposes of the 
expenditure was to earn income in the form of dividends and this purpose was 
achieved, the expenditure was not wholly incurred in the production of income 
and was partly an expense incurred in respect of an amount received which did 
not constitute income. The main point of contention before the court in this 
case, was whether having regard to all the circumstances, the connection 
between the expenditure incurred in the purchase of the shares and the receipt 
of the dividends was sufficiently close to justify the conclusions that the 
expenditure was incurred partly in the production of dividends. 
The court held that in a case such as this expenditure incurred in the acquisition 
of shares relating to companies where dividend stripping occurred should be 
apportioned in accordance with a formula. The apportionment had to be made of 
the expenditure in issue between that incurred by N in acquiring exempt income 
from the dividend stripping and that incurred by N in acquiring the income 
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derived from the sale of the dividend-stripped shares; and that such 
apportionment should be made in accordance with a special formula. 
The formula to be applied was an adaptation of one proposed in the CIR v Rand 
Selections Corporation Ltd 1956 (3) SA 124 (AD), and is as follows: 
A = (B + C) x D 
D + E 
Where A = deductible expenses 
B = general expenses relating to share-dealing 
C = total cost of acquisition of shares in companies subject to 
Dividend stripping in tax year 
D = total proceeds of the sale of such shares 
E = total dividends received in respect of such shares. 
The court accepted the apportionment of expenditure, based on the proportions 
of relative investment, in Income Tax Case No 832, 1956. In this case the 
appellant company ran a business, as a finance company. During the year of 
assessment in question, the Commissioner disallowed that proportion of 
expenses, which the income expected to be received by way of dividends bore to 
the income received from interest on loan. Though no income had been received 
or accrued in the year in respect of dividends, the Commissioner reassessed the 
amount on the basis of the proportion, which the relative investments bore to 
each other. 
It is common cause that the Act makes no provision for the apportionment of 
expenses, which cannot be specifically identified with particular items, in terms 
of section 11 (2) (a) of the Act read with section 78, the appellant company must 
show that any amount which it claims to deduct under section 11(2)(a) was 
actually incurred in the production of income. In respect of the company, the 
dividend on shares was of course never income in terms of the Act and therefore 
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moneys expended in earning dividends could not be deducted in terms of the 
applicable Act. 
With regards to its activities, it seemed impossible to say what activity or what 
portion of activities is actually devoted to earning interest from a loan investment 
and what is earned from other activities of the company through its directors. It 
seemed impossible for the company to show, any portion of its revenue was 
actually expended in the production of income by way of interest. According to 
1TC 607, 14 SATC 366, it has been recognized that where a taxpayer such as 
the company has revenue from more than one source, one such source justifying 
deductions because the revenue is taxable and another such source not 
justifying deductions because the revenue is not taxable, even if particular items 
of revenue cannot be identified with one or other source of revenue, an attempt 
can be made to apportion. 
In Commissioner for Revenue v Rand Selections Corporation, Ltd., 1956 (3) SA 
124 it was contended on behalf of the appellant company that, as the Act itself 
does not direct an apportionment of expenditure, or tell us how to ascertain what 
portion of the expenditure may be deducted from the "income", the whole of the 
expenditure is deductible from the "income". In that case the Court held that the 
proper method of apportioning expenditure in that case was to adopt the formula 
employing the proportion which income from one source bore to the revenue 
received by dividend from the other source. The Court, however, was not laying 
down a principle that a particular formula had to be employed. What it decided 
was that a fair method of apportionment had to be adopted for each case. 
The court held, dismissing the appeal that it was clear that some reduction had to 
be made in the expenditure, which was deductible and that the basis adopted by 
the Commissioner for determining the deductible proportion was fair and proper. 
A 50/50 basis of apportionment was suggestion by the appellant in Tuck v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue, 50 SATC 98, 1988 (3) SA 819 (A), and was 
also approved by the Court. In this case the appellant, in 1981 tax year, received 
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his first initial annual installment of 668 shares, which were worth R14 251. In his 
income tax return the taxpayer suggested that one half of this amount was 
remuneration for services rendered and the other half was a compensation for 
complying with the trade restraint. The taxpayer included in his return R7125 as 
income, claiming that the other half to be of a capital nature. 
During the 1982 tax year he again included another installment received from his 
contingent award account, advancing the same reasons as the previous year. 
The Commissioner rejected the demand for a deduction and instead issued 
additional assessment upon the appellant for the 1981 tax year. In the Special 
Court it was held that the whole of the sums in issue were of a capital nature. 
The Appeal Court took notice of the fact that both elements are important factors 
in the quid pro quo, which the employee provides in return for receiving the 
shares. 
If the employee does not provide the requisite service he does not qualify for an 
award; if he fails to comply with the restraint, he forfeits the award. The aim of 
the Plan was to provide incentive to improve service. The company also held 
trade restraint condition very highly such that any violations led to forfeiture of all 
rights to the shares credited to contingent award account. 
The court was of the view that, despite the absence of statutory authorization, the 
court has in the past approved of the principle of apportionment in dealing with 
the deductibility of expenditure which was partly of a capital nature and partly not. 
(Secretary for Inland Revenue v Guardian Assurance Holdings (SA) Ltd 1976 (4) 
SA 522 (A) at 533E - 34A). 
The court felt that apportionment provides a sensible and practical solution to the 
problem which arises when a taxpayer receives a single receipt and the quid pro 
quo contains two or more separate elements, one or more of which characterize 
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it as capital. In the absence of any other acceptable basis of apportionment, the 
court held that a 50/50 basis of apportionment would be fair and reasonable. 
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Chapter 3 
Data analysis and Interpretation 
3.1 Research design 
A research design, according to Cooper & Emory (Supra), is a blueprint, for 
collection, measurement, and analysis of data. It is imperative to have a 
research design that will explain how the research intends approaching the 
study. The research design specifies the type of information to be collected, the 
source of data, and the data collecting procedures. However, there Is no 
research standard to guide the researcher, since different types of designs can 
accomplish the same results. There are two main types of research designs, 
namely exploratory and conclusive research design. 
This study is going to use a case study method of research and will use existing 
information from books, journals, case law, and newspapers to find answers to 
the problem at hand. The researcher is of the opinion that the sources of 
information mentioned will provide enough information to be able to understand 
the problem being studied. The case study method involves an extensive 
investigation of the situations, which are relevant to the problem situation. The 
aim is to select several target income tax cases, which are considered relevant to 
the topic. 
These cases will be subjected to intensive analysis with the aim of identifying 
relevant variables, indicate the relationship among variable in order to identify 
the nature of the problem. The purpose is to obtain a comprehensive description 
of the cases and to formulate a better understanding of the variable operating. 
The advantage of using the case study method is that, according to the 
researcher, it is appropriate for the topic being dealt with, less expensive than 
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other research methodologies and can be accomplished in a shorter time than 
other conventional research methodologies. 
There will be fifteen income tax cases selected for analysis. All the cases 
chosen will be dealing with the topic of the research study being undertaken. 
The criteria for choosing theses cases will be based on the judgement and 
experience of the researcher. The researcher will choose those cases, which, 
according to his experience, will contribute to the answering of the research 
question at hand. 
These cases will be analyzed according to the following headings, namely; 
• Case title 
• Summary of facts 
• Matters of decision 
• Appellant's arguments 
• Respondent's arguments 
• Judgement 
• Ratio decidendi 
• The attitude of the court towards apportionment 
3.2 Analysis of Cases 
3.2.1 Case 1 
Case title; Local Investment Co v Commissioner of Taxes (S.R.) 1958(3) 
S.A.34 
3.2.1.1. Summary of facts 
The appellant company was trading as an investment company and from its 
business operations derived income amounting to £11,941 during the tax year in 
question. From the total income, €2037 was amount exempt from tax in terms of 
the Federal Income Tax Act, No 16 of 1954, whereas €9,904 constituted the 
income of the company liable for taxation. The company expended an amount of 
€2,459, €20 of which was wholly and exclusively expended in connection with 
non-taxable receipts of €2037. 
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The company sought to deduct from its income, during the tax year in question, 
the whole of its general expenses other than the £20, which had been genuinely 
expended for non-trade purposes. The Commissioner contended that some 
portion of the general expenses must be regarded as expenses incurred in 
respect of the non taxable receipts and that the only method of determining the 
amount to be excluded was by apportionment of the general expenses. The 
Commissioner accordingly apportioned the general expenses in the ratio that the 
receipts of non-taxable amounts bore to the receipts of taxable amounts and 
assessed the company accordingly. 
3.2.1.2 Matters of decision 
• The court had to decide whether the Commissioner was entitled to 
apportion as between the non-taxable amounts and 'income' 
• How is the apportionment to be made? 
3.2.1.3 Appellant's arguments 
The appellant seeks to deduct from his income the full expenditure of £2459 less 
£20, which the appellant concedes was expenditure which was wholly and 
exclusively incurred in the production of non-taxable amounts. The 
Commissioner rejected the appeal and confirmed the assessment. 
3.2.1.4 Respondent's arguments 
The Commissioner of Taxes disallowed the deduction of expenditure incurred but 
instead apportioned the total expenditure to the non-taxable amounts and 
'income' and only allowed as a deduction from 'income' an amount which bears 
the same proportion to the total expenditure as the 'income' bears to the 'gross 
income'. This amount is £413. 
3.2.1.5 Judgement 
• The court held that while the proportion of expenditure applicable to the 
non -taxable receipts had been incurred for the purposes of the 
company's trade, it had to be excluded from deductions allowed in the 
determination of the company's taxable income, in terms of section 23(f) 
of the Income Tax Act; 
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3.2.1.5 Judgement 
• The court held that while the proportion of expenditure applicable to the 
non -taxable receipts had been incurred for the purposes of the 
company's trade, it had to be excluded from deductions allowed in the 
determination of the company's taxable income, in terms of section 23(f) 
of the Income Tax Act, 
• That in the absence of proof as to the allocation of expenditure the 
Commissioner was entitled to apportion the general expenses as 
between the taxable and non-taxable receipts; 
• That the appellant had failed to establish that the Commissioner's 
apportionment had not been fair and reasonable, having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case. 
3.2.1.6 Ratio Decidendi 
In terms of section 23(f) of the Act, any portion of the expenditure, which is wholly 
and exclusively incurred in the production of non-income amount, is not allowed 
as a deduction. The general expenses could not be readily and accurately 
appropriated to 'income' and non-taxable amounts. According to the court, the 
only proper way, to deal with such expenses was to make and reasonable 
apportionment of these expenses as between 'income' and non-income amounts. 
3.2.1.7 The attitude of the Court towards apportionment 
The court looked at the applicable Act to ensure that it is properly taken into 
account. In this instance the court looked into the applicability of the so called 
'The deduction formula' and identified expenditure that was incurred for the 
purposes of earning income. In the same expenditure another amount was 
identified as being expended for non-income purposes and according to the court 
in Income Tax Case No 832, 1956, was expended for non-income purposes and 
as such was debarred from deduction. 
Then the court used apportionment as a device to separate the two expenditure 
amounts into their appropriate categories, e.g. expenditure that can be property 
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3.2.2.1 Case No 2 
3.2.2.2 Income Tax Case No 800,1954 
3.2.2.3 Summary of facts 
The company was operating in South West Africa with it main objects as to 
exploit mineral claims and was also entitled under its memorandum to carry on 
the business of investors and financiers and to lend, invest and put out at 
interest, its money. 
The company spent some money in the exploitation of the company's mineral 
claims but quickly stopped due to financial reasons. Thereafter the company 
decided to invest its cash in return for interest, as a result of which an interest 
amounting to £637 was earned. In its submission of its income tax returns, the 
company showed an amount of £637 as income for the year of assessment in 
question. 
The income returns also reflected expenditure on administration and secretarial 
charges, directors' fees, mining options and rights written off and claims licenses 
amounting to £2497. An expenditure amounting to £1148, which was included in 
the amount of £2497, was incurred during the period January 1952, when the 
company first invested its funds, to 30th June 1952. 
The Commissioner for Inland Revenue allowed as a deduction from interest 
received, the sum of £32 being an amount calculated as 5% of the sum of £637, 
representing an estimate of the expenses incurred in the production of such 
interest. 
3.2.2.4 Matters of decision 
The court had to decide whether to allow as a deduction monies received for the 
whole year or for the period between February and June 1952, during which the 
appellant was investing its money on interest bearing business. The court had to 
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determine whether the overhead expenses of carrying on the business of the 
appellant were wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of 
trade in making investments. 
3.2.2.5 Appellant's arguments 
The appellant company claimed as a deduction an amount totaling €1148, 
against income of £637. As regards to the rest of the expenditure, the 
appellant's representative conceded that it had been correctly disallowed as it 
was incurred during a period when the company was not engaged in earning the 
income of £637. 
3.2.2.6 Respondent's arguments 
The Commissioner contended that; 
• The expenditure of £1148 was not incurred in the production of income 
• It was capital expenditure, and 
• It is not deductible under section 12(g) of the Act in that it was not wholly 
or exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade, and that in the present 
case only such portion of the expenditure, if any, as was incurred in the 
production of the interest on the loans made by the company and which 
was not of a capital nature is allowable, and that only if it can be separated 
from the rest of the expenditure. 
3.2.2.7 Judgement 
• The court held that expenses incurred by the appellant during the active 
period, from February to June inclusive, be separated from the expenses 
incurred during the whole year and apportioning these expenses on the 
basis of time. 
• The court also decided that an amount of £571, as recommended by the 
appellant, be allowed as a deduction from expenditure as an amount 
expended during the active period, in order to earn £637 income. 
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3.2.2.8 Ratio decidendi 
• The expenditure of €571 was incurred during the active period in order to 
earn income of £637and according to the case Income Tax Case No 73, 
1926, the expenditure has to bear a direct relationship to the income 
produced or earned. 
• The expenditure had to be dissected between the amount incurred during 
the active period and the amount that was incurred during the period 
outside the active period. 
3.2.2.9 The attitude of the court towards apportionment 
The court had to look at the time during which the business was being carried on. 
The loan that produced interest was made during the so-called active period; that 
is, between the months of February and July of the same tax year. The 
expenditure incurred during the active period that had to be taken into account 
when determining the deductibility of expenditure in terms of section 11 (a) of the 
Act. 
In this case the expenditure in question was expended for the whole year, 
whereas the business operations to produce interest was only during the active 
period. The court therefore held that the expenditure had to be apportioned 
according to the period during which the operations for the production of income 
were carried on and the period outside the active period during which no 
production of income took place. 
The trade requirement of section 23(g) was also not fulfilled, in that outside the 
active period there was no trading, therefore no deduction was allowable. It 
would seem therefore that the court took its cue from the 'deduction formula' to 
be able to solve this case. 
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3.2.4 Case no 3 
3.2.4.1 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Guardian Assurance Holdings 
(SA) Ltd 38 SATC 111, 1976 (4) SA 522 (A) 
3.2.4.2 Summary of facts: 
The respondent company issued six million shares by public issue. In so doing 
the company hoped that the issue would be over subscribed affording the 
company an opportunity to earn extra income, between the closing date for 
applications and the date when excess application moneys were refunded. The 
company anticipated that a substantial profit would be made by way of interest 
on subscribed moneys. 
As it turned out, shares were oversubscribed and the company made substantial 
profits from interest on short term investment of subscription money prior to 
refund of excess applications. In the process of earning these profits, expenses 
were incurred. The company in its income tax return sought to deduct these 
expenses as being incurred in the production of the interest earned. The 
Secretary having refused the deduction, the respondent approached the Special 
Court, which held that the expenses sought were genuine expenses 'incurred 
with the express purpose of making a profit and that this profit was decidedly 
sought for and worked for and was the result of a planned effort'. 
The Special Court also express the view that the respondent had two dominant 
motives in incurring the total expenses, namely the raising of capital and the 
making of a profit by way of interest, that apportionment of expenses between 
those two objectives was permissible in principle; and that section 23(g) of the 
Act did not debar the expenditure in issue from deduction. 
3.2.4.3. Appellant's arguments 
> The Secretary submitted that, although income had been earned, all the 
expenditure incurred was of a capital nature because the total expenditure 
incurred was one and indivisible, more especially since every applicant 
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was allotted at least 25 shares; that there was thus a capital element in 
every item of expenditure incurred; and that, on the analogy of section 
23(g) of the Act, it would be anomalous to allow a deduction under section 
11(a) where expenditure is incurred partly for income purposes and partly 
for capital purposes. 
• That even if permissible in principle, apportionment was precluded on the 
facts since the dominant purpose of the whole operation was to raise 
capital, the making of profit being ancillary or incidental thereto; and that 
all the expenditure incurred by respondent was, therefore, of a capital 
nature. 
> That, even if apportionment were to be applied, there is no sensible or 
clear basis upon which it could be applied, other than arbitrarily, which 
would be contrary to the intention of the Act. 
> The Secretary further contended that ordinarily and naturally expenditure 
incurred by a company in raising capital by an issue of shares, whether by 
way of private placing or by way of a public issue, constituted expenditure 
of a capital nature. 
> That although the possibility of deriving interest from the short term 
investment of excess application monies may have been an incentive for 
the decision to raise R9000000 capital by way of a public issue, 
nevertheless all the expenditure of R226 755, referred to in paragraph 
3(9)(a), constituted expenditure of a capital nature in that 
1. The said expenditure was related to and was wholly or dominantly 
incurred for the purpose of raising the said capital and 
• That no part of such expenditure related to or was incurred for the 
purpose of earning interest and that such interest as was received, viz, 
R616 049, represented income to which no expenditure was attached 
and which was derived merely as a collateral advantage to the method 
of raising capital adopted. 
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• That the appellant's claim as presented for the first time in its return of 
income that portion of the expenditure had been laid out for the 
purposes of making a profit in respect of interest was an afterthought. 
3.2.4.4. Respondent's arguments 
> The respondent submitted that while the object of offering shares to the 
public was to raise capital, the object could have been achieved by private 
placing at limited or basic costs of a capital nature. 
> That the respondent decided to adopt a method of public issue, at a 
greater expense than that involved in a private placing, took the deliberate 
decision to incur additional expense involve in a public issue, whatever the 
amount might be, in order to make a profit, being the difference between 
the amount of interest that might be earned on the temporary investment 
of excess application monies and the said additional expenses, 
> That in the circumstances the said additional expenses, was, in terms of 
section 11(a) of the Act, expenditure incurred in the production of income 
and not of a capital nature, in that it was incurred in the separate venture, 
distinct from the main operation of raising capital, entered into for the 
purposes of making profit; 
> That the said additional expenditure was wholly and exclusively laid out for 
the purposes of trade within the meaning of section 23(g) of the Act. 
> That the amount of the said expenditure was determinable on the basis of 
proper apportionment or allocation of the total expenditure incurred and 
the court should grant an order referring the matter back to the Secretary 
for re-assessment accordingly. 
3.2.4.5. Matters of Decision 
Whether the issuing of shares was for the purposes of raising capital of making a 
profit? 
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Was the expenditure in question directed at the raising of capital or in order to 
produce profit as claimed by the respondent? 
If the expenditure was made with the purpose of a mixed motives, was 
apportionment possible? 
Whether apportionment was permissible regardless of the applicability of section 
23(g) 
3.2.4.6. Judgement 
The court held; 
• That the whole of the expenditure should not be regarded as of a capital 
nature and that there existed no objection in principle to an apportionment; 
nor would apportionment be inconsistent with section 23(g) of the Act. 
• The raising of capital could not be said to be the dominant purpose. That 
two objectives, i.e. the raising of capital and the earning of income had 
been pursued. And that expenditure incurred in excess of what would 
have been expended in raising R9 million by private placing must be 
regarded as incurred in the production of income. 
• The expenditure in excess of that required to raise R9 million capital by a 
private placing had been incurred with the express object of producing 
income, and it would be contrary to the basic principles of the Act not to 
permit an apportionment. 
• That there is no basis for believing that apportionment would be arbitrary; 
and it suffice to say that prima facie the apportionment suggested by the 
respondent was sensible and clear and that, in any event, other methods 
of achieving a logical and fair apportionment may exist. 
3.2.4.7 Ratio Decidendi 
The expenditure was incurred for a dual purpose, namely for raising capital and 
for earning income. Therefore it was possible to allocate or apportion 
expenditure incurred for raising capital, which was not deductible in terms of 
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section 11 (a) of the Act, and expenditure incurred in the production of interest, 
which is deductible in terms of the same Act. 
3.2.4.8 The Court's attitude towards apportionment 
The court was of the opinion that it would be contrary to the basic principles of 
the Act not to permit of an apportionment. The court's view was that the 
expenditure was laid out to raise capital and to make a profit; two distinct 
motives. Therefore the expenditure was incurred in order to raise capital, which 
was a capital expenditure and is not deductible in terms of section 11(a) of the 
Act. The same expenditure was incurred in order to earn income from the short-
term interest, and was fully deductible in terms of section 11 (a) of the Act. Both 
the raising of capital and the producing profit was made for the purposes of the 
appellant's trade, in terms of section 23(g) of the Act, and was thus not barred 
from deduction. 
3.2.5.1 Case No 4 
3.2.5.2 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Rand Selections Corporation Ltd, 
1956 (3) SA 124; 220 SATC 390 
3.2.5.3 Summary of Facts 
The respondent company carried on business of share dealing and investments 
in shares. The company spent £367859 in acquiring additional shares in the L 
Company. The L Company was liquidated and paid the respondent €336434 for 
its shares. 
The Commissioner, in the determination of the respondent's taxable income 
regarded the amount of €212311 paid by the liquidators to the respondent as 
constituting the return to the company and the amount of €124123 as a 
liquidation dividend. 
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The Commissioner excluded the expenses incurred by the company in respect of 
the portion of the amount received from the liquidators as dividends. This meant 
that the Commissioner had allowed an amount of £212311 as admissible 
expenditure with regards to the issue price of the shares and disallowed the 
balance of the expenditure amounting to £155549 as having been incurred in 
respect of the liquidation dividend received from profits earned by the liquidated 
company. 
The Special Court dismissed the appeal by the respondent but in the Transvaal 
Provincial Division of the Supreme Court, the appeal by the respondent was 
upheld. The Court held that the company was entitled to deduct the full amount 
paid by it for the shares as an item of expenditure incurred in its business of 
share dealing and excluded the amount received as a dividend from profits from 
the gross income derived from that business. The Commissioner appealed 
against this decision. 
3.2.5.4 Appellants Arguments 
The Commissioner sought to exclude the expenses incurred by the company in 
respect of that portion of the amount received from the liquidation. 
The Commissioner also disallowed the deduction of the expenditure in respect of 
an amount of £155 549 as having been incurred in respect of the liquidation 
dividend received from profits earned by the liquidated company. 
3.2.5.5 Respondent's arguments 
The respondent contended that the amount of £155 549 was a loss suffered on 
its dealings with Lace shares. 
The respondent company also submitted that it was entitled to deduct the full 
amount paid by it for the shares as an item of expenditure incurred in its business 
of share dealing. 
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3.2.5.6 Matters of decision 
Should the expenditure on an amount of income received, which also included a 
portion of dividend, be allowed as a deduction? 
How should apportionment of expenditure be determined? 
3.2.5.7 Judgement 
The court held; 
That the expenditure incurred by the company in the production of the total sum 
received, the portion of that sum consisted of dividends and therefore a portion of 
the expenditure incurred towards the production thereof is not allowable as a 
deduction in the determination of the company's taxable income. 
That the amount allocated to the production of dividends could not be fixed 
arbitrarily, but should be determined by the proportion which the dividends bore 
to the total amount produced by the expenditure. 
The court further suggested the method of apportionment in the form of the 
following formula, namely: 
X multiplied by y 
y plus z 
i.e. £367859x212311 
336434 
The resulting figure from this formula would represent the amount of the 
expenditure, which is deductible under section 11 (2)(a) 
3.2.5.7 Ratio decidendi 
As dividends are not regarded as income in terms of the definition of the term 
"income' in section 1 of The Act, expenditure incurred in the production thereof is 
not allowable as deduction in terms of section 11(a) of the Act. 
81 
The respondent company was trading as a share dealer, and as such any 
income from shares sales is income in terms of section 11(a) of the Income Tax 
Act. 
The attitude of the Court towards apportionment 
• The court was of the opinion that it is important to understand that 
sections 11(2)(a) and 12(f) read together sanction apportionment of 
expenditure. Section 11(2)(a) allows the deduction of expenditure 
incurred in the production of income, whereas section 12(f) disallows 
expenditure which is not wholly and exclusively laid out for the purposes of 
trade. The court, however, suggested that such an apportionment would 
be based on the fact that he Legislature has split the liquidation dividends 
into two components parts. 
• The court suggested that the a portion of the expenditure attributable to 
the 'income' can be deducted under section 11 (2)(a), and the income 
exempt from tax, i.e. dividend, would not be allowed a deduction. This is 
because section 11(2)(a) precludes the deduction of expenditure which 
has been laid out for the production of exempt income. 
32.6.1 Case No 5 
3.2.6.2 Mallalieu v Drummond (Inspector of Taxes) 1983 
3.2.6.2 Summary of Facts 
The taxpayer was practicing as a lawyer. During the year in question she had 
spent about £564 on the replacement, cleaning and laundering her clothing, 
which she used as uniform for her professional work. She sought to deduct that 
sum in the determination of her taxable income as being expenses wholly or 
exclusively expended in the production of her income. The Inspector of Taxes 
disallowed that expenditure as a deduction on the grounds that the expenditure 
had a dual motive, the professional one of enabling her to earn profits in her 
profession and the private one of enabling her to be properly clothed while 
engaged in her professional activity. 
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3.2.6.3 Appellant's arguments 
The appellant taxpayer sought to deduct expenditure incurred on the 
replacement, cleaning and laundering of certain items of clothing which she wore 
in court, as being wholly and exclusively expended for the purposes of her 
profession, within section 31(a) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970. 
3.2.6.3 Respondent's arguments 
The Commissioner submitted that the appellant had two objects in making the 
expenditure, to serve the purpose of her business and to serve her own purpose 
by enabling her properly to be clothed. 
3.2.6.4 Matters of decision 
Whether the expenditure in question had been wholly and exclusively expended 
for the purposes of the taxpayer's profession. 
3.2.6.5 Judgement 
The court held that, as the barrister needed clothes to travel to work and clothes 
to wear at work, it is true that one object, though not a conscious motive, was 
the provision of the clothing that she needed as a human being. Thus the court 
felt that the expenditure was incurred for mixed motives, one for her profession, 
which was deductible in terms of section 11(a) of the Act, and one for private 
purpose, which was non deductible in terms of section 23(g), which precludes the 
deduction of expenditure incurred for non trade purposes. 
3.2.6.6 Ratio Decidendi 
The expenditure was incurred for mixed motives, one was incurred to produce 
income, and the other one was incurred for private purpose, the deduction of 
which is precluded by the terms of section 23(g) of the Act. 
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The expenditure was incurred for mixed motives, one was incurred to produce 
income, and the other one was incurred for private purpose, the deduction of 
which is precluded by the terms of section 23(g) of the Act. 
3.2.5.8 The court's attitude towards apportionment of expenditure 
The taxpayer's main concern was the deduction of expenditure incurred in the 
production of income, but the Commissioner refused to allow the deduction of 
expenditure, because the expenditure was not 'wholly and exclusively' incurred 
for the purposes of trade in terms of section 23(g) of the Act. The Commissioner 
submitted that the expenditure was intended for another purpose, a private 
purpose, which was debarred from deduction by the terms of section 23(g) of the 
Act. This meant that the expenditure was incurred for two purposes; one was a 
business purpose and the other a private purpose. 
If the taxpayer incurred the expenditure for the purposes of trade and partly for 
capital purposes, there can be apportionment under section 11(a) as was 
confirmed in ' Secretary for Inland Revenue v Guardian Assurance Holdings 
(SA) Ltd 1976 (4) SA 522 (A), 38 SATC 111. If the taxpayer has incurred 
expenditure for two purposes, one of them a 'trading' purpose and the other not, 
then it seems that an apportionment will be made either under section 11(a) or 
under section 23(g). It is evident that whenever the applicability of apportionment 
is being determined, the courts will always ensure that the expenditure does 





The reasons the courts resort to apportionment of expenditure 
The court in I.T.C. No 800 laid down the principle of law with regards to 
apportionment of expenditure as follows; "Where a lump-sum expenditure is 
sought to be deducted from one's taxable income, that sum must have been 
wholly or exclusively expended for the purposes of trade. If portion of such 
lump-sum was so laid out and portion was not and if it is not possible to allocate 
each portion to its appropriate purpose, then no portion of such lump-sum can 
be deducted. 
But if the lump-sum can be dissected and that portion expended for the 
purposes of trade can be identified, such portion may be deducted." 
The court in this case decided that expenses should be apportioned to those 
incurred during the period when the loan was earning interest from the period 
when no such interest was being earned. This was the principle of matching 
expenditure with income earned. 
The court in Local Investment Co v COT. (S.R.) supra, explained the reasons 
that lead to apportionment of expenditure, as being that many businesses are 
bound to have expenses of a general nature, which cannot be accurately 
appropriated to 'income' and non income amounts. The only proper way, the 
court suggested, to deal with such expenses is to make a fair and reasonable 
apportionment of these expense as between "income' and non-taxable amounts, 
as the case may be. 
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It is clear from cases such as A.G.M., Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes, that where a 
taxpayer engages in activities which are productive of both 'income' as defined in 
the Act and the amounts which are not 'income' as so defined, it is proper to 
apportion such items of general expenditure incurred by the taxpayer as cannot 
be directly connected with any particular amount received by the taxpayer, 
between the taxpayer's productive and non productive activities, and to allow as 
a deduction only that proportion of such general expenditure as can be fairly and 
reasonably be said to appertain to the activities of the taxpayer which are 
productive of income. 
This was the case in the case, Mallalieu v Dummond, supra, where a taxpayer 
practicing as a barrister was claiming a deduction on the expenditure she 
incurred on replacement, cleaning and laundering of certain items of clothing 
which she wore in court, the court held that the expenditure was laid out with 
mixed motives, one for 'income' and the other for private purpose, which was 
debarred from deduction in terms of section 23(g) of the Act. For this reason 
the court sanction apportionment of that expenditure such that the 'income' 
portion should be allowed a deduction and the non-trade income denied 
deduction for reasons aforementioned. 
The other case analyzed was Secretary for Inland Revenue v Guardian Assurance 
Holdings Ltd 1976, where the appellant company was claiming deduction on 
profit made on short term interest made on excess applications. The 
Commissioner was resisting the claim on the grounds that the expenditure was 
of a capital nature and not deductible. 
The court concluded that the expenditure had elements of capital and also 
income and as such an apportionment of expenditure was appropriate in the 
circumstance. The court in Local Investment Co v C.O.T, supra, supported the 
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view that, though the Act does not sanction apportionment, is no argument for 
holding that either 'all' or 'none' of the general expenses may be deducted. 
4.2 The provisions of the Income Tax Act with regards to apportionment of 
expenditure 
In C.I.R. v Rand Selections Corporation Ltd, the court had to decide whether the 
company under section ll(2)(a) read with section 12(0 of the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962, was entitled to deduct the whole amount of £367,859, which was an 
amount paid for shares, or only a portion thereof. 
The court held that under section ll(2)(a) expenditure actually incurred in the 
production of 'income' might be deducted while the effect of section 12(f) was 
that expenditure in the production of the 'dividend' might not be deducted. The 
amount of £367859 was incurred in order to get liquidation shares. The 
liquidation shares dividends consisted of 'income' and 'dividends' and according 
to the court, in terms of sections ll(2)(a) and 12(f) read together, there was a 
need to apportion expenditure accordingly. 
The court then suggested a formula according to which apportionment could be 
effected. What the court did was to analyze the purpose of expenditure and 
allocated the amounts, which were incurred for different purposes, namely, 
'income' and 'non income' purposes, in terms of the Act. 
The court in Income Tax Case No 1524, 1990, when considering the applicability 
of apportionment, that for any portion of the expenditure to be deductible, it 
must pass the deductibility test as set out in sections 11(a) and 23(g) of the Act 
58 of 1962. The prohibition in section 23(g) was overruled in CIR v Rand 
Selection Corporation Ltd 1956 (3) SA 124 (A), where the court approved 
apportionment of expenditure claimed under section 11(a) in an earlier case 
involving a taxpayer that incurred expenditure in earning an amount comprised 
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both of income and exempt income, and again in SIR v Guardian Assurance 
Holding (SA) Ltd, where a taxpayer incurred expenditure partly of a capital 
nature and partly of a revenue nature. 
The court in Mallalieu v Drummond, supra, had to decide whether the barrister 
when she bought her professional clothes, she had two motives in mind, one 
being at acquire clothing for business purpose and the other one, a private 
purpose, being the provision of clothing as a human being. In terms of the 
deduction formula, expenditure incurred for business purpose is deductible in 
terms of section 11(a) of the Act. 
Expenditure incurred for a taxpayer's private purpose is not deductible in terms 
of section 23(g) of the Act. The Court, therefore held that expenditure had to be 
apportioned such that the portion of expenditure which passed the deduction 
test, was allowed as a deduction, while the expenditure that was not allowable 
as a deduction in terms of the Act, was disallowed. 
In the case of Port Elizabeth Tramway Company Limited v Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue, 8 SATC , the court said that there were three qualifications that 
must exist before money paid out could be deducted from income, and they 
were: 
• The expenditure must be actually incurred 
• It must not be of a capital nature 
*> It must be incurred in the production of income. No deduction may be 
made unless the expenditure was wholly and exclusively laid out or 
expended for the purposes of trade. Section 23(g) 
It is thus important that before a deduction of expenditure may be considered, 
the expenditure must pass the test of the three qualifications previously 
mentioned. In the case of an amount of expenditure, which is laid out for more 
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than one purpose, the court in UC No 800, supra, held that section 23(g) does 
not forbid the dissection of a lump-sum amount of expenditure proportionately 
into sums each allocated to different items of income if this can be done. When 
examining the terms of section 23(g), nothing is said about the dissection of a 
lump-sum amount of expenditure. 
In the case of Secretary for Inland Revenue v Guardian Assurance Holdings Ltd, 
supra, the court had to decide on the deductibility of expenditure, which was 
incurred for two purposes. The court held that" the total expenses incurred, 
had 'two dominant motives', namely, the raising of capital and the making of a 
profit by way of interest, and that, in the absence of any prohibition in the 
Income Tax Act, there could be no reason in principle why the expenses should 
not be apportioned, i.e. those expenses relating to the raising of the capital to be 
regarded as capital expenditure and those which were incurred to make the 
profit being regarded as revenue expenditure." 
The court further held that the expenditure in question was not debarred as a 
deduction under section 23(g) of the Act. The court further explained that 
expenditure is disallowed as a deduction, in terms of section 23(g), if it is in part 
incurred for private purposes whereas (non-trade purpose), on the other hand, 
where expenditure is incurred for the purpose of raising capital and for the 
purposes of earning an income (trade purposes), an apportionment is permitted 
so that an apportioned share of the expenditure can be deducted from the 
income earned. 
It is clear, in the court's analogy, that where expenditure is not wholly or 
exclusively laid out expended for the purposes of trade, deduction is denied. 
The court again ruled that in terms of section 23(g) expenditure is disallowed as 
a deduction if it is in part incurred for private purposes whereas, on the other 
hand where expenditure is incurred for the purposes of raising capital and for the 
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purposes of earning income, an apportionment is permitted so that an 
apportioned share of the expenditure can be deducted from the income earned. 
The true role of section 23(g) is to reinforce the trade requirement of the 
opening words in section 11(a) and adding some further safeguard to the 
'production of income' test set up by section 11(a). There is an alternative view 
with regard to section 23(g) that the trade or non trade issue is a dead letter and 
that the specific purpose of the amended prohibition is to authorize 
apportionment in a backhanded manner(SILKE: 2001). 
4.3 Methods of apportionment 
A method of apportionment adopted depends on the particular circumstances of 
each case but the court in Local Investment Co v COT. (S.R.) held that' the 
question of fact being to make a fair apportionment to each object of the 
company's actual expenditure, where items are not in themselves referable to 
one object or the other'. 
A fair method of apportionment is the one which takes the proportion that the 
capital invested in the operations earning the non-taxable amount bears to the 
total capital invested. In ITC 832 (1956) 21 SATC 320, once it was clear that 
some reduction had to be made in the expenditure that was deductible because 
some portion of the company's capital was invested in share investments, the 
court had the problem of determining whether the basis adopted by the 
Commissioner in arriving at the figure of deductible expenditure, was a fair and 
on proper basis. In that case, the Commissioner permitted the deduction of an 
amount which bore to the expenditure claimed the same ratio as the capital 
invested in the income producing assets bore to the total sum of the company's 
invested capital. 
The Special court opinion was that there may have been much in the company's 
criticism that expenditure in relation to a share investment does not really bear 
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any relationship to the cost of an investment, and it may be that the division of 
the expenditure upon the basis of the proportions of the costs of the relative 
assets may be artificial, but, in the court's view, it was no more artificial than the 
division upon the basis of the proportions of the different amounts of revenue 
received from the different sources. The court considered that the 'asset to 
assets' basis adopted by the Commissioner in this case was in no way unfair to 
the taxpayer. 
In regards to apportionment on the basis of capital employed, the Special Court 
has held that this must be determined by reference to the initial cost of the 
assets. The court saw no justification for requiring an annual valuation of assets 
for purposes of apportionment (ITC 1026 (1963) 26 SATC 26) 
It was also suggested in Income Tax Case No 832, 1956, supra, that 
apportionment of expenditure is possible where a taxpayer such as a company 
has revenue from more than one source, one such source justifying deductions 
because revenue is taxable and another such source not justifying deductions 
because revenue is not taxable, even if particular items of revenue cannot be 
identified with one or other source of revenue. 
Before expenditure can be considered for deduction, it must be established that 
it is linked to income from which deduction is sought. Where expenditure cannot 
be linked to any income, the court in Income Tax Case No 607, 14 SATC 366 
suggested that apportionment must be disallowed. The Income Tax Act has no 
provisions for apportionment of expenditure, but it is implied in section 11(a) 
which permits only deductions of expenditure as is actually incurred in the 
production of income. 
In the ITC No 1026,1963, the appellant, a property and investment company 
was objecting to the Commissioner's rejection of it claim for deduction of 
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expenditure from its income during the year in question. The Commissioner 
dismissed the appellant's objection on the basis that the proportion of 
expenditure which he had disallowed was incurred in respect of amounts 
received or accrued which are not included in the term 'income' as defined in the 
Act and that accordingly section 23(f) of the Act prohibited its deduction. He 
then proceeded to apportion management expenses of the company on the basis 
of the respective values of the productive and non-productive assets and 
disallowed the deduction of the amount relative to the non-productive assets. 
The court in the case 'Secretary for Inland Revenue v Guardian Assurance 
Holding (SA) Ltd 38 SATC 111, 1976 (4) SA 522 (A)', supra, had to decide the 
basis on which apportionment of expenditure in question could be made. The 
court, however agreed with the respondent's suggested method of 
apportionment that where expenditure is laid out partly for income purposes and 
partly for capital purposes, but still exclusively for the purposes of trade, an 
apportionment should be permitted so as to allow a deduction in respect of that 
part of the expenditure apportioned to income. 
Where expenditure has been directly incurred in respect of a particular class of 
income, for example, where money is borrowed specifically for the purpose of 
acquiring a rent producing property, then according to Income Tax Reporter 
(1973), the expenditure is properly deductible under section 11(a) from the 
particular income derived. But where the expenditure has been incurred for the 
benefit of the company's investment business as a whole and not in respect of a 
particular class of income, for example, directors' fees, rent, etc, the correct 
approach must be to apportion the expenditure over the various types of income. 
No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the basis of allocation in such 
circumstances. 
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The method of apportionment recommended in the case of Local Investment Co 
v COT, supra, is the one based on the proportion, which the different types of 
income bear to the total income. For example, the bulk of expenditure might be 
devoted exclusively to operations intended to earn income that in fact earn very 
little income, whereas from operations that incurred little expenses, relatively 
large non taxable amounts are earned. In such a case, to apportion the bulk of 
the expenses to non-taxable amounts would be unfair. 
In ITC No 800, 1954, supra, the court was of the opinion that only expenditure 
incurred during the active period of between January to June 1952, should be 
considered for deduction. The court in this case held that, in a proper case 
where facts justify it, allocations for expenditure can be made in various ways, 
namely on a time basis or pierce work basis. The court, however, in this 
instance, made allocation on a time basis because the expenditure that earned 
income was during the active period and the one outside the active period was 
disallowed. 
The method of apportionment adopted by the court in CIR v Rand Selections 
Corporation Ltd, 1956,supra, was that the amount allocated to the production 
the dividends should be determined by the proportion which dividends bore to 
the total amount produced by the expenditure. The court recommended that a 
formula should be adopted as follows; 
X multiplied by y/yplus/Z 
i.e. £367,859 X 2122,311/336,434 
The answer from this formula will represent the amount of the expenditure 
which is deductible under section ll(2)(a). 
In Mallalieu v Drummond 1983 the court found that the purpose of the taxpayer 
in incurring the expenditure was for business but had an incidental 'effecf of 
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some private pleasure or advantage. As the taxpayer incurred expenditure partly 
for revenue purposes and partly for private purposes, the court held that 
apportionment was permissible either under section 11(a) or section 23(g). 
Apportionment in this case was not complicated as the amount of expenditure to 
be allowed as a deduction under section 11(a) could be determined according to 
time spent in the court room. The time spent in chambers, could be allocated to 
the time when clothing was used for private purposes, and as such was not 
deductible. 
4.4 Attitude of the courts towards apportionment of expenditure 
The courts are obliged to act in accordance with the provisions of the Income 
Tax Act whenever they are called upon to decide on a particular case. The same 
is expected of them when deciding on the deductibility of expenditure incurred 
for more than one purpose. Whilst there is no specific provision of the Act which 
direct apportionment of expenditure, the courts have in the past used 
apportionment as a solution which is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of 
the particular case (ITC 1589 (1993 57 SATC 153 (Z). 
The court in CIR v Rand Selection Corporation had to decide as to whether the 
company under section 12(2)(a) read with section 12(f) was entitled to deduct 
the whole amount of £367859 or a portion thereof. This expenditure was 
incurred in the production of income amounting to £336434. This income 
amount consisted of £212311, which was a return of floating capital, and 
£124123, which was a dividend. 
In terms of section ll(2)(a) expenditure actually incurred in the production of 
'income7 may be deducted while the effect of section 12(f) is that expenditure 
incurred in the production of dividends is not allowable as deduction. The 
liquidation dividends consisted, therefore, of 'dividends' and 'income' and thus it 
would have been wrong to regard the amount of expenditure as having 
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produced 'income' only, but 'income' plus 'dividends' and, being so, the court 
decided to apply apportionment as envisaged by section ll(2)(a) read with 
section 12(f) together. 
The court decided to apportion expenditure so as to allow deduction of 
expenditure incurred in the production of 'income' and to disallow the deduction 
of expenditure incurred in the production of dividends. The court, it is evident in 
this case, applied apportionment of expenditure in terms of the provisions of 
sections 12(2)(a) and 12(0 of the Income Tax Act. 
In Mallalieu v Drummond (1983) 2 All ER 1095 (HL) the court had to look at the 
question of whether expenditure had been wholly and exclusively expended for 
the purposes of the taxpayer's trade. In order to establish whether the moneys 
were expended to serve the purpose of the taxpayer's business, it is necessary to 
discover the taxpayer's 'objecf in making the expenditure. Section 23(g) in its 
present form prohibits the deduction of expenditure to the extent to which it is 
expended for the purposes of trade. 
It is therefore important to establish whether expenditure is laid out entirely for 
the purposes of trade, if not, then to determine apportionment. In determining 
whether expenditure is deductible, the purpose of the taxpayer in incurring the 
expenditure must be established first. If the taxpayer incurred expenditure 
partly for revenue purpose and partly for capital purposes but wholly for trading 
purposes, there can be apportionment under section 11(a). If the taxpayer 
incurred expenditure for two purposes, one of them a trading' purpose and the 
other not, then it seems that an apportionment can be made either under section 
11(a) or under section 23(g). 
The court in this case, held that expenditure had been made not only for the 
purposes of appellant's profession, but also for personal purposes, namely so 
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that she could be warmly and decently clothed, thus expenditure had been 
incurred for a dual purpose and in this instance disqualified from deduction. 
The court disqualified the deduction of expenditure because, in terms of the 
previous version of section 23(g), expenditure which is not 'wholly and 
exclusively' expended for the purposes of trade is debarred from deduction. 
Expenditure incurred for a dual purpose, one being 'income' and the other being 
non income, but wholly for the purposes of trade, was looked into by the court in 
SIR v Guardian Assurance Holdings (SA) Ltd 1976 (4) SA 522 (A). The court held 
that where the expenditure is laid out partly for private purposes, no 
apportionment, and therefore no deduction, should be allowed, as that could 
lead to abuse, whereas in the case where expenditure is laid out for the 
purposes of trade, an apportionment should be permitted so as to allow a 
deduction in respect of that part of the expenditure apportioned to income. 
The court in this case established that the expenditure in question was incurred 
for the taxpayer's trade and therefore section 23(g) was not applicable. The 
expenditure had been incurred to raise capital and also to produce income in the 
form of short-term interest. In terms of section 11(a) of the Act, expenditure 
incurred for the production of income, in this case, interest, is deductible 
whereas expenditure laid out for to raise capital is considered to be capital 
expenditure and is debarred from deduction from income. For this reason the 
court decided to apportion expenditure in accordance with the provisions of the 
'general deduction formula'. 
It is evident that whilst the Income Tax Act does not provide any guidance with 
regards to apportionment of expenditure incurred for a dual purpose, 
apportionment is implied in section 11(a) read with section 23(g) of the Income 
Tax Act. In ITC 607,1945, the court said " It is true that the Act itself does not 
contain provisions for such apportionment, but it may be regarded as implied 
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from the terms of section ll(2)(a)# which permits only the deduction of such 
expenditure as is actually incurred in the production of income". 
In UC 800, supra, the court had to apply apportionment on the basis of time. In 
this case the taxpayer was claiming deduction of expenditure for the whole year 
from income produced during a specific active period i.e.(from January to June). 
The court contended that expenditure is only deductible from income if there is a 
direct relationship between expenditure and the income produced. The same 
test of deductibility of expenditure from income was used in ITC No 73 (SATC 
64). 
In this case the appellant became the owner of certain premises from the 1st of 
April, 1925, and as the owner he became liable to pay rates levied for twelve 
months ended the 31st December, 1925, payment of which fell due in April in 
each year. The court held that the Commissioner was correct in apportioning the 
expenditure on rates to the period of the tax year during which the appellant 
occupied the premises, i.e., a quarter, during which the appellant had derived 
income from the property. 
In ITC No 318 (8 SATC 174) there was a break of six months due to rebuilding 
operations. During this time there was no earning of income. Here the 
Commissioner's disaliowance of the expenditure on rates during the period of 
unproductiveness, was upheld. 
Judge C.J. Ingram, K.C. President, in delivering the judgement of the court, 
summarized the approach of the court to apportionment as follows: "The 
underlying principles laid down by these decisions is that the expenditure, the 
deduction of which is claimed, must be linked to the income that is earned; and 
where it is possible to apportion the expenditure to the income so earned such 
apportionment must be made; and that expenditure which cannot be so linked, 
97 
apportioned must be disallowed. Further, that where the expenditure overlaps 
the tax year a similar apportionment must take place". 
The court in ITC 832 pointed out that it is recognized that where a taxpayer such 
as a company has revenue from more than one source, one such source 
justifying deduction because the revenue is taxable and another source not 
justifying deductions because the revenue is not taxable, even if the particular 
items of revenue cannot be identified with one or other source of revenue, an 
attempt can be made to apportion. 
It is clear from cases such as Local Investment Co v Commissioner of Taxes, 
1958 R & N 116, and AGM Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes, Income Tax Appeal No 
25 of 1962 not yet reported, that the attitudes of the courts is that where a 
taxpayer engages in activities which are productive of both "income' as defined in 
the Act and of amounts which are not 'income' as so defined, it is proper to 
apportion such items of general expenditure incurred by the taxpayer as cannot 
be directly connected with any particular amount received by the taxpayer, 
between the taxpayer's productive and non-productive activities, and to allow as 
a deduction only that portion of such general expenditure as can be fairly and 
reasonably be said to appertain to the activities of the taxpayer which are 
productive of income. 
The court in ITC 800, 1954, laid out the principles as regards to apportionment 
of expenditure as being that where a lump-sum expenditure is sought to be 
deducted from one's taxable income, that sum must have been wholly or 
exclusively expended for the purposes of trade. If portion of such lump-sum was 
so laid out and portion was not and if it is not possible to allocate each portion to 
its appropriate purpose, then no portion of such lump-sum can be deducted. 
The allocation can be made in various ways, namely, on a time basis, or perhaps 
on a piece-work basis. 
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Corbett JA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd (1983) 45 
SATC 241 described apportionment as a device which has been resorted to 
where expenditure in a globular sum has been incurred by a taxpayer for two 
purposes, one of which qualifies for deduction and one of which does not. He 
continued: 
"It is a practical solution to what otherwise could be an intractable problem and 
in a situation where the only other answers, viz disallowance of the whole 
amount of expenditure or allowance of the whole thereof, would produce 
inequity or anomaly one way or another. In making such an apportionment the 
court considers what would be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the 
case." 
In conclusion, the courts use apportionment as a solution to the problem, which 
if left unsolved, would create imbalances to all parties to the dispute. While the 
legislature has made no provision with regards to expenditures with dual 
motives, the courts have used the provisions of the Income Tax Act, to make 




5.1 Expenditure must be incurred Nn the production of income' 
All cases and literature analyzed showed that an expenditure sought to be 
deducted by a taxpayer, should first pass the test of deductibility in terms of 
section 11(a) read with section 23(g) before any apportionment exercise is 
undertaken. In the determination of a person's taxable income from carrying on 
any trade in any year, it was suggested in Sub-Nigel Ltd v CIR 1948 (4) SA 580 
(a), 15 SATC 381, that, in terms of section 11(a) expenditure actually incurred by 
him in the production of income, is deductible from such a person's income. 
The principle of the deductibility of expenditure was laid out in Port Elizabeth 
Electric Tramway Company Ltd v CIR 1936 CPD 241, 8 SATC 13, where the court 
held that an expenditure is deductible in terms of section 11(a) if the purpose of 
the taxpayer in doing the act which entail the expenditure was to produce 
income, and also if the expenditure was so closely linked to that act as to be 
regarded as part of the cost of performing it. 
The second test of deductibility of expenditure, is the trade test in terms of 
section 23(g) of the Act, which, according to Joffe & Co Ltd v CIR, 1946 AD 157, 
allows as a deduction all expenditure necessarily attached to the performance of 
the operations which constitute the carrying on of the income earning trade, and 
also all expenditure which, though not attached to the trading operations of 
necessity, is yet bona fide incurred for the purpose of carrying on trade, provided 
such payments are wholly and exclusively made for that purpose and are not 






In CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 1955 (3) SA 293 (A): 20 SATC 113, the court held 
that when determining how expenditure should properly be regarded, the Court 
has to assess the closeness of the connection between the expenditure and the 
income earning operations having regard both to the purpose of the expenditure 
and to what it effects. Section 11(a) read with section 23(g) of the Act compel a 
taxpayer to show that, any amount claimed as a deduction under section 11(a), 
was actually incurred in the production of income. 
In all the cases analyzed that deal with apportionment of expenditure, the courts 
seem to agree, as was the case especially in Rand Selections case, supra, that 
the Income Tax Act makes no provision for apportionment of expenditure which 
cannot be specifically identified with particular items, or explain how to 
determine what portion of expenditure may be deducted from 'income' or 
whether the whole of the expenditure is deductible from such 'income'. Whilst 
there is consensus that the Act contains no provision for apportionments, 
however but it may be implied from the terms of section 11(a) which permits 
only the deduction of such expenditure as is actually incurred in the production 
of income. 
Many courts' decisions do recognize that where a taxpayer has revenue from 
more than one source, one such source justifying deductions because the 
revenue is taxable and another such source not justifying deductions because 
the revenue is not taxable, an attempt can be made to apportion (ITC No 832: 
1956). It is clear that in most cases, including, Schonegevel v CIR 1937 CPD 
258, the courts use apportionment of expenditure as a devise to solve a 
problem, where expenditure in a globular sum has been incurred by a taxpayer 
for two purposes, one of which qualifies for deduction and one of which does 
not. 
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Corbett JA in CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd, supra, held that apportionment of 
expenditure is a practical solution to what otherwise would be an intractable 
problem. In making such apportionment the courts consider what would be fair 
and reasonable in all circumstances 
The courts use apportionment of expenditure to solve problems created by 
expenditure incurred for dual motives, namely 
1. Where expenditure is laid out to receive non taxable income 
and taxable income (CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 935 
(A), 45 SATC 241) 
2. Where a taxpayer incurs expenditure for two purposes one 
business and the other one private (Maflalieu v Drummond 1983 
2 All ER 10955 (HL) 
3. Where a taxpayer incurs expenditure with a dual motive of 
producing both income and capital. (SIR v Guardian Assurance 
Holdings (SA) Ltd 1976 ($) SA 522 (A), 33 SATC 111) 
4. Where expenditure is incurred during the period when income is 
not earned, in other words, during the period when no income 
is produced, is not to be allowed be deducted (ITC No 
490:1941) 
5.2 Apportionment sanctioned by the Section 11(a) read with section23(g) of 
the Income Tax Act no 58 of 1962 
The principle of apportionment of expenditure is a robust one, and enjoys the 
support of both the courts and the Receiver of revenue, as was said in the 
"Explanatory Memorandum on Income Tax Bill, 1992" that, "it has been a long 
standing practice of Inland Revenue, which has in the past been accepted by the 
courts, to allow apportronment of expenditure incurred partly for purposes of 
trade and partly for purposes other than trade". The current section 23(g) 
explicitly envisages apportionment, whilst it prohibits deduction on moneys only 
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'to the extent to which' they are not laid out or expended for the purposes of 
trade. 
The court in ITC No 607, 1945, held that apportionment should be regarded as 
implied from the terms of section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act, which permits 
only the deduction of such expenditure as is actuaiiy incurred in the production 
of income. 
The current role of section 23(g) is to ensure that amounts claimed as 
deductions against income derived from trade were in fact laid out or expended 
for the purposes of trade. In other words, section 23(g) reinforce the 'trade' 
requirement of the opening words of section 11(a) of the Act and adding some 
further safeguard to the 'production of income test set up by section 11(a) of the 
Act. 
The drawback on this approach is that it reinforces the concept of the general 
deduction formula that places two clogs on deductibility: in order to be 
deductible under the deduction formula, an amount must be incurred in the 
production of income, and, in addition, that income must be associated with 
trade. Technically, then, expenditure incurred to earn 'non-trade' but 
nevertheless taxable income, for example, interest, is not allowable, although in 
practice it is usually allowed. There is also an alternative view with regards to 
the 'trade/'non-trade' issue, that, the specific object of section 23(g) is to 
authorize apportionment, in a backhanded way. 
Section 12(g) (old version of section 23(g)) does not forbid the dissection of a 
lump-sum of expenditure proportionately into sums each allocated to different 
items of income if this can be done. This view was expressed by the court in TTC 
No 800, 1954, the court was interpreting the meaning of section 12(g) which 
provides that' any monies claimed as a deduction from income derived from 
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trade which are not wholly or exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes 
of trade' may not be deducted from income'. 
It would appear that as long as an expenditure is wholly or exclusively laid out 
for the purposes of trade an apportionment is permissible for the purposes of 
section 11 (a) read with section 23(g) of the Act (SIR v Guardian Assurance 
Holdings (SA) Ltd 1976 (4) SA 522). In CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd, Corbett JA 
referred to apportionment as a practical solution to a difficult problem. In that 
case apportionment sanctioned was necessitated by the conjunction of section 
11(a) and section 23(f) since the expenditure under review was found to have 
been incurred partly for the purpose of producing' income' as defined, and partly 
with the purpose of producing income exempt from tax in terms of section 10 of 
the Act. 
The prohibition in section 23(g) has not prevented the Appellate Division from 
approving apportionment of expenditure claimed under section 11(a) in a case 
involving a taxpayer that incurred expenditure in earning an amount comprised 
both income and exempt income (CIR v Rand Selections Corporation Ltd, supra) 
Where expenditure is laid out partly for the purposes of earning income and 
partly for private purpose or for purposes not connected in anyway with the 
trade carried on by the taxpayer, it may be said that the expenditure is not 
wholly or exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of trade; therefore no 
portion is deductible in terms of section 23(g) (CIR v Pick n' Pay Wholesalers 
(Pty) Ltd 1987 (3) SA 453 (A)). 
The court, in SIR v Guardian Assurance Holdings (SA) Ltd, supra, said: "The 
legislature may well have considered that, in a case where expenditure is laid out 
partly for private purposes, no apportionment, and therefore no deduction 
should be allowed as that could lead to abuse, whereas, in the case where 
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expenditure is laid out partly for income purposes and partly for capital purposes, 
but still exclusively for purposes of trade, an apportionment should be permitted 
so as to allow a deduction in respect of that part of the expenditure apportioned 
to income." 
5.3 Methods of apportionment 
The method the courts adopt to apportion expenditure is, as was held in the 
case of Local Investment Co v COT 19 (3) SA 34 (SR), a question of fact 
depending upon the particular circumstances of each case, but the courts do 
their best to ensure that apportionment is fair and reasonable in all 
circumstances. In ITC 3 (1906) 1 SATC 3, once it was clear that some reduction 
had to be made in the expenditure that was deductible because some portion of 
the company's capital was invested in share investments, the court had the 
problem of determining whether the basis adopted by the Commissioner in 
arriving at the figure of deductible expenditure was fair and proper basis. 
In that case the Commissioner permitted the deduction of an amount which bore 
to the expenditure claimed the same ratio as the capital invested in the income 
producing assets bore to the total sum of the company's invested capital. 
The court considered that the 'assets to assets' basis adopted by the 
Commissioner in this case was in no way unfair to the taxpayer, thus the court 
held that the Commissioner's method of apportionment should be adopted. 
The court, in ITC 1017, 1963, held that apportionment in that case should be on 
the basis of the capital employed in the various ventures, unless the taxpayer 
could adduce evidence to the contrary- The Special Court had earlier on 
suggested that apportionment could be determined by reference to the initial 
cost of the assets. 
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The court in ITC No 607,14 SATC 366, approved the principle that where a 
taxpayer such as a company has revenue from more than one source, one such 
source justifying deductions, because the revenue is taxable and another such 
source not justifying deductions, because the revenue is not taxable, even if 
particular items of revenue cannot be identified with one or the other source of 
revenue, an attempt can be made to apportion. The court, in this case, further 
held that before any expenditure can be considered for deduction, a link to the 
income that is earned, must be established. Where it is possible to apportion 
expenditure to the income so earned, such apportionment must be made. 
Expenditure, which cannot be linked and apportioned, must be disallowed. 
Where expenditure overlaps the tax year, a similar apportionment must be 
made. 
An example of apportionment of expenditure which could not be identified with 
either the revenue that was taxable or revenue that was not taxable but which 
was obviously incurred in respect of both such types of revenue appears in the 
case of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Rand Selections Corporation, Ltd, 
supra. In that case, the court held that a proper method of apportionment of 
expenditure was to adopt the formula employing the proportion, which, the 
income from the one source bore to the revenue received by dividend from the 
other source. 
The appellant in ITC No 703, 1950, was claiming a deduction on expenditure for 
services rendered and the erection of a factory. The court disallowed the 
deduction on expenditure incurred for the erection of the factory but approved 
the claim for the services rendered. The court, in this case, apportioned 
expenditure on a pro rata basis, that is, expenditure incurred for services 
rendered was allowed as a deduction and expenditure expended on the erection 
of the factory was disallowed because it was of a capital nature in terms of 
section 11(a). 
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The principle laid out in these court decisions was that where a lump-sum 
expenditure is sought to be deducted from one's taxable income, that sum must 
have been wholly or exclusively expended for the purposes of trade. If portion 
of such lump-sum was so laid out and the other portion was not and if it is not 
possible to allocate each portion to its appropriate purpose, then no portion of 
such lump-sum can be deducted. But if such lump-sum can be apportioned and 
the portion expended for the purposes of trade can be identified, such portion 
may be deducted. The apportionment, the court suggested, can be made in 
various ways, namely, on a time basis or on a piecework basis (ITC No 832 
1956). 
There are instances and situations where it becomes imperative to apportion 
expenditure in order to solve a problem, which, if nothing is done, there would 
be dissatisfaction from both parties in the dispute, namely: 
1. where expenditure is antecedent to the production of any income 
2. where a period intervenes due to some external cause during which no 
income is produced 
3. where owing to business ceasing to function or becoming unprofitable, no 
further income is derived, or 
4. where the expenditure overlaps the tax year, being partly attributable to a 
prior year or to a succeeding year. 
It is true that the Act contains no provisions for apportionments, but several 
courts' decisions have confirmed that apportionment is implied in sectionll (a) 
of the Act, which permits only the deduction of such expenditure as is actually 




6.1 Apportionment of expenditure should be used as a solution 
Apportionment of expenditure should be used as a solution to the problem where 
a single amount has been expended for more than one purpose. The 
deductibility or non-deductibility of expenditure can only be established if the 
purpose of the act entailing expenditure is known. It is therefore important to 
analyze the expenditure properly in order to establish its true nature. The courts 
have recommended that apportionment must be fair and reasonable depending 
on the circumstances of the case. Apportionment of expenditure must aiso take 
into account the provisions of general deduction formula. 
6.2 The legislature involvement 
The Legislature can also assist by providing direction with regards to the method 
of solving the problem posed by expenditure with mixed motives. The 
amendment of section 23(g) of the Act is not clear cut to ordinary tax payers 
who are forced to consult expensive tax consultants for assistance. The Income 
Tax Act no 58 of 1962 should be amended so that apportionment of expenditure 
with mixed motives must be dealt with in a wholehearted manner, to avoid 
confusion to the taxpayers. 
The South African Revenue Services need to take a lead in guiding taxpayers 
with regards to solving the problem of deductibility of expenditure incurred for a 
dual purpose. SARS must issue a Practice Note with regards to its approach to 
this problem of the deductibility of expenditure with mixed motives. 
In conclusion it is evident from the findings of this dissertation that the courts 
have been playing a vital role resolving cases where the deductibility of 
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expenditure incurred with more than one purpose, was the issue. The approach 
by our court, according to the opinion of the researcher, was the correct one, 
because, the courts never deviated from the provisions of the Income Tax Act. 
The courts' main approach to the deductibility of expenditures with a dual 
purpose was to be fair in all respects to all parties concerned. 
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